Kotecki v. Cyclops Welding Corp.: A Judicial Balancing Act by Schachter, Michael S.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 42 
Issue 2 Winter 1992 Article 7 
Kotecki v. Cyclops Welding Corp.: A Judicial Balancing Act 
Michael S. Schachter 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Michael S. Schachter, Kotecki v. Cyclops Welding Corp.: A Judicial Balancing Act, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 741 
(1992) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol42/iss2/7 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact 
digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
KOTECKI v. CYCLOPS WELDING CORP.: A JUDICIAL
BALANCING ACT
Perhaps the most evenly-balanced controversy in all of compensation law is
the question whether a third party in an action by the employee can get
contribution or indemnity from the employer, when the employer's negli-
gence has caused or contributed to the injury.'
INTRODUCTION
In 1977, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice
Division Package Machinery Co.,' allowed a defendant-manufac-
turer to seek contribution from the plaintiff's employer in an amount
commensurate with the employer's degree of fault.' The plaintiff-
employee had been injured at work while using the manufacturer's
product.' The court's opinion demonstrated an interest in safeguard-
ing the principle of equitable apportionment at the expense of the
protection of employers granted by the Workers' Compensation Act
and at the expense of the doctrine of strict liability. The decision in
Skinner, therefore, was an attempt by the court to balance the com-
peting interests of contribution, workers' compensation, and strict
liability.
Fourteen years after Skinner, in Kotecki v. Cyclops Welding
Corp.,' those same interests arose again, yet different policy consid-
erations came up winners. In Kotecki, the Illinois Supreme Court
held that an employer's liability in contribution to defendants sued
by employees injured at work is limited by the employer's statutory
liability to the employee under the Workers' Compensation Act.'
Thus, the interest in preserving the integrity of the workers' com-
pensation system emerged victorious. This triumph, however, came
at the expense of a stranger to the workers' compensation system
who gains nothing in that bargain - the third-party tortfeasor. An-
1. 2B ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 76.11 (1992).
2. 374 N.E.2d 437 (11. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
3. Id. at 443.
4. Id. at 438.
5. 585 N.E.2d 1023 (I1. 1991).
6. Id. at 1028.
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other victor was the doctrine of strict liability in defective products
cases.
This Note begins by examining the origins and policies of contri-
bution, workers' compensation, and strict liability. Next, it discusses
how Illinois courts and other jurisdictions have balanced these con-
cepts in the past. After this foundation is laid, this Note argues that
the Kotecki decision is a dramatic break from precedent and repre-
sents a rebalancing of delicate policy considerations by the Illinois
Supreme Court. The Note also examines the practical effects of the
Kotecki decision and proposes some answers to some of the ques-
tions left open by the court's decision. Finally, this Note discusses
the impact of the Kotecki decision upon employers, third-party
tortfeasors, and employees.
I. BACKGROUND
The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Kotecki v. Cyclops
Welding Corp.7 involved the interplay of several different legal con-
cepts: the right of contribution, the employer immunity provided by
the Workers' Compensation Act,8 and strict liability. The history
and development of these principles provide the necessary back-
ground for the Kotecki decision. This section begins by examining
the basic principles and underlying policy considerations of the
changing methods for apportionment of damages among multiple
tortfeasors. Next, it discusses the origin and purpose of the Work-
ers' Compensation Act. The doctrine of strict liability in product
liability cases is then examined. Finally, this section explores how
Illinois courts have dealt with the competing policy considerations
supporting each of these concepts.
A. The Allocation of Damages among Multiple Tortfeasors
The issue of how to allocate damages among multiple tortfeasors
arises when more than one party has contributed to the same injury
to the same victim. In such cases, these parties are referred to as
"joint tortfeasors." 9 The allocation of damages among joint
7. 585 N.E.2d 1023 (111. 1991).
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 138.5(a), 138.11 (1991) (820 ILCS 305/5(a), 35/11 (1992)).
Illinois Revised Statutes were replaced by Illinois Compiled Statutes on January 1, 1993. The text
of this Note will refer to Illinois Revised Statute provisions; however, Illinois Compiled Statutes
cites will be given parenthetically in the footnotes.
9. The term joint tortfeasors "refers to two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for
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tortfeasors is a subject that has undergone many changes over time.
The different methods of allocation that have been attempted in-
clude the common law approach, indemnity, and contribution.
1. The Common Law Approach
Under the common law rule, a plaintiff who was injured by a
number of parties had complete autonomy to decide whether to sue
one or all of the potential defendants."° A plaintiff not only could
choose whom to sue, but upon successfully obtaining a judgment
against joint tortfeasors, he also was free to decide from whom to
collect." The plaintiff was free to base this choice on the existence
of liability insurance, on the plaintiff's own whim or spite, or on any
other factors upon which the plaintiff cared to rely.' 2
At common law, a marginally culpable tortfeasor could be forced
to pay the entire judgment while the major wrongdoer went "scot
free."" One purpose for the no-contribution rule was that it served
as a deterrent for wrongdoers by placing each tortfeasor in the posi-
tion of being responsible for the entire amount of the plaintiff's
damages."' Another major justification for the common law rule was
the concern that courts not spend their time settling the disputes of
wrongdoers. 5
2. Indemnity
The unfair results yielded by the common law system of alloca-
the same injury to person or property. Those persons who have acted in concert in their tortious
conduct . . .are, accordingly, jointly and severally liable." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 839 (6th
ed. 1990).
10. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 50, at 336 (5th
ed. 1984). Under the common law rule, if A, B, and C caused the same injury to the same victim,
that victim could "place the entire loss on A, or on both A and B, or on A, B and C either in
equal or unequal proportion." Comment, The Allocation of Loss Among Joint Tortfeasors, 41 S.
CAL. L. REV. 728, 732 (1968). If a judgment was entered against a defendant, that defendant had
no recourse but to pay. A defendant had no way to recover partially from either a co-defendant or
another culpable party not joined in the action. This made it possible for full liability to be im-
posed upon a defendant who was responsible for only a very small percentage of the harm.
11. KEETON ET AL., supra note 10 § 50, at 338.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Deborah Alley, A Judicial Rule of Contribution Among Tortfeasors in Illinois, 1978 LAW
F. 633, 635.
15. Id. at 635-36; see also Reese v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 303 N.E.2d 382, 386
(111. 1973) ("[T]he principal objection to contribution [is] use of the courts for relief of
wrongdoers ....").
1992]
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tion of damages sparked the development of indemnity and contri-
bution. Although both indemnity and contribution grant a defend-
ant the right to reallocate the responsibility for the payment of the
plaintiff's damages, there are distinct differences between the two
methods. Indemnity allows a defendant who was forced to satisfy a
judgment for an injury for which he and another tortfeasor are
jointly and severally liable to recover the entire amount that he was
forced to pay'from the other tortfeasor or tortfeasors.'8 In other
words, indemnity is the right of a defendant to get reimbursement
for one-hundred percent of a judgment he paid from another liable
party, but not for a smaller percentage. 7 Thus, indemnity is a right
to an all-or-nothing recovery.
There are a number of different types of indemnity. The right to
indemnification may arise from a contract 8 and is sometimes called
express indemnity. 19 A right to indemnity may also arise from situa-
tions in which a promise to indemnify can be implied from the rela-
tionship among the tortfeasors.2 ° Implied indemnity comes in two
different forms. The first is quasi-contractual implied indemnity,
which is based on equitable principles of restitution.2 This right of
implied indemnity exists when an indemnitee is without fault but is
still subject to liability due to her legal relationship with the plaintiff
or due to a nondelegable duty arising out of common or statutory
law." For example, an employer who is held liable in tort for the
negligent acts of its employee under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior has a right to indemnification from its employee.2"
16. Frazer v. A.F. Munsterman, Inc., 527 N.E.2d 1248, 1251 (111. 1988).
17. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 51, at 341.
18. Frazer, 527 N.E.2d at 1251; see Westinghouse Elec. Elevator Co. v. LaSalle Monroe Bldg.
Corp., 70 N.E.2d 604 (111. 1947) (holding that an indemnity contract will not be construed as
indemnifying against a party's negligence unless such a construction is required by clear and ex-
plicit language in the contract).
19. Express indemnity is prohibited under certain circumstances. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para.
61 (1991) (740 ILCS 35/1 (1992)) provides the following:
With respect to contracts or agreements, either public or private, for the construction,
alteration, repair or maintenance of a building, structure, highway bridge, viaducts or
other work dealing with construction, or for any moving, demolition or excavation
connected therewith, every covenant, promise or agreement to indemnify or hold
harmless another person from that person's own negligence is void as against public
policy and wholly unenforceable.
id.
20. Frazer, 527 N.E.2d at 1251.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1252.
23. Id. This is true as long as the employer did not participate in the tortious conduct. Id.
[Vol. 42:741
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The concept of implied indemnity was expanded to grant a right
of indemnification not only to a defendant who is without fault, but
also to include situations where there is a qualitative differeffce in
the negligence of the culpable parties.24 Under this second form of
implied indemnity, which came to be known as active/passive im-
plied indemnity, the courts found that where the conduct of one
tortfeasor is the primary cause of the plaintiff's damages (i.e., the
conduct is active negligence), and the conduct of the other
tortfeasor is only a secondary cause of the injury (i.e., the conduct is
passive negligence), the passively negligent party has the right to.
shift the entire burden of paying the plaintiff's damages to the ac-
tively negligent party.25 Since the recognition of the right of contri-
bution in Illinois, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that active/
passive implied indemnity is no longer a viable doctrine.2 6
3. Contribution
While indemnity allows one defendant to shift the entire responsi-
bility for payment of damages to another party, contribution allows
a defendant who has satisfied a judgment to seek partial reimburse-
ment from other tortfeasors who are also responsible for the plain-
tiff's injury.27 The reimbursement is determined in accordance with
24. Id.
25. See Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc., where the plaintiff pedestrian was injured by a
vehicle driven by the defendant while crossing the street at an intersection. 229 N.E.2d 769 (I11.
App. Ct. 1967). The second count of the plaintiff's complaint charged the co-defendants with
negligently parking a vehicle in the crosswalk. Id. at 770. The court held that a jury could find the
co-defendants only passively negligent and, thus, entitled to indemnification from the original de-
fendant involved in the collision. Id. at 776. The court stated that " '[plassive negligence exists
where one person negligently brings about a condition or an occasion and active negligence exists
where another party negligently acts upon that condition and perpetrates a wrong.'" Id. at 772
(quoting Southwestern Greyhound Lines v. Crown Coach Co., 178 F.2d 628, 632 (8th Cir.
1949)).
The qualitative distinction that creates a right of active/passive indemnity in product liability
cases was defined differently by the Illinois Supreme Court: "Typically, it was the 'active' negli-
gence of one party that creates a dangerous condition which caused the plaintiff's injury, and the
other party's negligence amounted to no more than the failure to discover and correct it." Frazer,
527 N.E.2d at 1252.
26. Allison v. Shell, 495 N.E.2d 496, 501 (II1. 1986).
27. See Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co., where the Illinois Supreme
Court stated:
"There is an important distinction between contribution, which distributes the loss
among the tortfeasors by requiring each to pay his proportionate share, and indem-
nity, which shifts the entire loss from one tort feasor who has been compelled to pay it
to the shoulders of another who should bear it instead."
374 N.E.2d 437, 439 (I11. 1979) (quoting Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182, 188 (111.
1992]
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each of the joint tortfeasors' shares of culpability.28 Contribution is
based on the theory of equitable apportionment, which allocates lia-
bility for damages in accordance with culpability.2 9 The right of
contribution allows a tortfeasor who is sued by a plaintiff to file a
third-party action for contribution against a joint tortfeasor in order
to force the third-party defendant to contribute his pro rata share of
the plaintiff's damages, based on the third party's percentage of
fault. 30
B. The Illinois Workers' Compensation Act
At common law, an employee injured at work could maintain an
action against her employer in tort if she could demonstrate that her
injury was proximately caused by a breach of the employer's duty of
care owed to her.3' However, even if the employer was negligent, it
often escaped liability through the defenses of contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk. 2 The common law system frequently
left injured employees unable to work and dependent on the state
for assistance.33
Workers' compensation statutes were enacted to create no-fault
compensation systems. Generally, these statutes provide that when
an employee is injured in an accident that arises out of and in the
1965)), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
28. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 303 (1991) (740 ILCS 10/3 (1992)) ("The pro rata share
of each tortfeasor shall be determined in accordance with his relative culpability.").
29. Eileen M. Walsh & Eugene G. Doherty, Section 2-1117: Several Liability's Effect on Set-
tlement and Contribution, 79 ILL. B.J. 122 (1991).
30. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, paras. 302, 303, 305 (1991) (740 ILCS 100/2, 100/3, 100/5
(1992)).
31. KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 80, at 568-69. At common law, there were five duties
owed by an employer to an employee for which the employer could be held liable:
1. The duty to provide a safe workplace.
2. The duty to provide safe appliances, tools, and equipment.
3. The duty to give warning of dangers of which the employee might reasonably be expected to
remain in ignorance.
4. The duty to provide a sufficient number of fellow servants.
5. The duty to promulgate and enforce rules for the conduct of employees which would make
work safe.
Id. at 569.
32. Id. at 569.
33. See Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., where the court stated:
The difficulty of proof and delay in the courts often provided no remedy, subjected the
injured employee to deprivation of livelihood, reduced him to poverty, and produced
antagonisms between employers and employees to the point that under the police
power, something had to be done.
366 N.E.2d 1145, 1146 (111. App. Ct. 1977).
[Vol. 42:741
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course of her employment, the employee has a right to workers'
compensation benefits, regardless of fault.34 Negligence is irrelevant
to the determination of whether an employee is entitled to workers'
compensation benefits.3 5 The goals of workers' compensation stat-
utes are to provide certain and swift financial protection to injured
employees and their families"6 and to place the cost of workplace
injuries on industry rather than on the public or on individual em-
ployees who incur work-related injuries.7
The Illinois Workers' Compensation Act defines the benefits that
an employer must give an employee who has been injured in the
course of her employment. 8 First, the employer must provide the
34. 1 LARSON, supra note 1, § 2.10; see Orsini v. Industrial Comm'n, 509 N.E.2d 1005 (Il1.
1987). The court in Orsini stated:
An injury is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act only if it "aris[es]
out of" and "in the course of" the employment. The phrase "in the course of" refers
to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident occurred. . .. An
injury "arising out of" one's employment may be defined as one which has its origin
in some risk so connected with, or incidental to, the employment as to create a causal
connection between the employment and the injury. For an injury to have arisen out
of the employment, the risk of injury must be a risk peculiar to the work or a risk to
which the employee is exposed to a greater degree than the general public by reason
of his employment. A risk is incidental to the employment when it belongs to or is
connected with what the employee has to do in fulfilling his duties. If the injury re-
sults from a hazard to which the employee would have been equally exposed apart
from the employment, then it does not arise out of it. Thus, an inquiry is not compen-
sable if it resulted from a risk personal to the employee rather than incidental to the
employment.
Id. at 1008-09 (citations omitted).
35. 1 LARSON, supra note 1, § 2.10.
Let the employer's conduct be flawless in its perfection, and let the employee's be
abysmal in its clumsiness, rashness and ineptitude: if the accident arises out of and in
the course of employment, the employee receives his award. Reverse the positions,
with a careless and stupid employer and a wholly innocent employee: the same award
issues.
Id.
36. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Il1. 1979); Laffoon v. Bell & Zoller Coal
Co., 359 N.E.2d 125, 129 (I11. 1976).
37. Vaught v. Industrial Comm'n, 287 N.E.2d 701, 706 (I11. 1972). One commentator stated:
The ultimate social philosophy behind compensation liability is belief in the wisdom of
providing, in the most efficient, most dignified, and most certain form, financial and
medical benefits for the victims of work-connected injuries which an enlightened com-
munity would feel obliged to provide in any case in some less satisfactory form, and of
allocating the burden of these payments to the most appropriate source of payment,
the consumer of the product.
I LARSON, supra note 1, § 2.20.
38. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.8 (1991) (820 ILCS 35/8 (1992)). The amount of com-
pensation to be awarded when an accidental injury to an employee results in death is addressed in
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.7 (820 ILCS 305/7 (1992)). The Illinois Workers' Compensa-
tion Act is administered by the. Illinois Industrial Commission. Id. para. 138.13 (820 ILCS 305/
13 (1992)).
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employee with medical care from the doctor of the employee's
choice.39 Second, the employee is entitled to two-thirds of her aver-
age weekly wage while she is unable to work and under a doctor's
care."' Most importantly, the employer is required to compensate
the injured employee for the permanent effect of her injury.4' Pain
and suffering is not compensable under the Workers' Compensation
Act. In exchange for giving the previously mentioned benefits to
every employee injured in the course of employment without regard
to fault, the employer gains immunity from any action at law by the
employee for damages for any injury that is compensable under the
Workers' Compensation Act.42
39. Id. para. 138.8(a) (820 ILCS 305/8(a) (1992)). This provision states:
The employer shall provide and pay for all necessary first aid, medical and surgical
services, and all necessary medical, surgical and hospital services thereafter incurred,
limited, however, to that which is reasonably required to cure or relieve from the
effects of the accidental injury. The employer shall also pay for treatment, instruction
and training necessary for the physical, mental and vocational rehabilitation of the
employee, including all maintenance costs and expenses incidental thereto. If as a
result of the injury the employee is unable to be self-sufficient the employer shall
further pay for such maintenance or institutional care as shall be required.
The employee may at any time elect to secure his own physician, surgeon and hos-
pital services at the employer's expense ....
Id.
40. Id. para. 138.8(b)(1) (820 ILCS 305/8(b)(1) (1992)).
41. Id. para. 138.8(d)(2) (820 ILCS 305/8(d)(2) (1992)). The amount of compensation to
which the employee is entitled is determined by multiplying sixty percent of the employee's aver-
age weekly wage by a certain number of weeks. The appropriate number of weeks to be used
depends on the value ascribed to the injured part of the body by the Workers' Compensation Act.
Id. para. 138.8(e) & (b)(2.1) (820 ILCS 305/8(e) & (b)(2.1) (1992)). For example, the complete
loss of the use of a thumb is worth seventy weeks. Id. para. 138.8(e)(1) (820 ILCS 305/8(e)(1)
(1992)). Thus, if an employee who was earning $300 per week lost her entire thumb in an acci-
dent which occurred in the course of her employment, she would be entitled to $12,600 as com-
pensation for her permanent injury.
If, however, an employee sustained a complete disability which rendered her wholly and perma-
nently incapable of work, or if she lost both of her hands, arms, feet, legs, or eyes, she would not
recover compensation for the permanency of the injury. Id. para. 138.8(f) (820 ILCS 305/8(f)
(1992)). Instead, she would receive 66 3% of her salary for the duration of her life. Id. para.
138.8(b)(2) & (f) (820 ILCS 305/8(b)(2) & (f) (1992)). If, at any time, a completely disabled
employee's weekly benefits fall below 50% of the statewide average weekly wage, she is entitled to
supplemental benefits from the Rate Adjustment Fund. Id. para. 138.8(b)(4.1) & (f) (305/
8(b)(4.1) & (f) (1992)).
42. Id. paras. 138.5(a), 138.11 (820 ILCS 35/5(a), 35/11) (1992)). The Workers' Compensa-
tion Act provides:
§ 5. (a) No common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer
• . . [or] his insurer . . . for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged
in the line of his duty as such employee, other than the compensation herein provided,
is available to any employee who is covered by the provisions of this Act . . ..
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Even though the employer is required to pay the statutory benefits
to an employee whose injury arises out of and in the course of em-
ployment without regard to fault, the employer may have an oppor-
tunity to recoup the benefits it has paid."' If an employee injured at
work recovers damages from a third party in a separate tort action
arising from the same incident, the employer has a right to recoup
the statutory benefits that the employer paid to the employee under
the Workers' Compensation Act." However, the amount that the
employer is reimbursed is reduced by the employer's share of the
costs and expenses incurred in the employee's third-party claim.4 5
An employer's liability under a workers' compensation statute is
akin to an implied contract entered into between the employer and
employee in which each side gives valuable consideration.4" The
tradeoff is the following: The employee gives up her right to an ac-
tion in tort before a jury, where pain and suffering is an element of
damages, in exchange for prompt compensation each time she sus-
tains an injury which arises out of and in the course of employment,
without regard to fault.' 7 The employer gives up its right to raise
§ I1. The compensation herein provided, together with the provisions of this Act, shall
be the measure of the responsibility of any employer ....
Id.
43. Id. para. 138.5(b) (820 ILCS 35/5(b) (1992)). This section provides in pertinent part:
Where the injury or death for which compensation is payable under this Act was
caused under circumstances creating a legal liability for damages on the part of some
person other than his employer to pay damages, . . . [if] judgment is obtained and
paid, or settlement is made with such other person, either with or without suit, then
from the amount received by such employee or personal representative there shall be
paid to the employer the amount of compensation paid or to be paid by him to such
employer or personal representative.
Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. This section provides:
Out of any reimbursement received by the employer pursuant to this Section, the
employer shall pay his pro rata share of all costs and reasonably necessary expenses in
connection with such third-party claim, action or suit and where the services of an
attorney at law of the employee or dependents have resulted in or substantially con-
tributed to the procurement by suit, settlement or otherwise of the proceeds out of
which the employer is reimbursed, then, in the absence of other agreement, the em-
ployer shall pay such attorney 25% of the gross amount of such reimbursement.
Id.
46. Huntoon v. Pritchard, 20 N.E.2d 53, 57 (I11. 1939).
47. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., where thecourt stated:
Pursuant to the statutory scheme implemented by the [Workers' Compensation] Act,
the employee gave up his common law rights to sue his employer in tort, but recovery
for injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment became automatic
without regard to any fault on his part. The employer, who gave up his right to plead
the numerous common law defenses, was compelled to pay, but his liability became
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 42:741
common law defenses to mitigate its liability and must compensate
every employee who is injured at work even if the employer is en-
tirely free from fault. The employer then is immune from tort ac-
tions and does not have to compensate injured employees for their
pain and suffering.48
C. Product Liability
The term "product liability" refers to the area of law that deals
with the liability of suppliers of goods and products that are defec-
tive.49 In Illinois, strict liability was first recognized as a basis for
recovery in defective product cases by the Illinois Supreme Court in
Suvada v. White Motor Co.50 The court based its decision in that
case on the strong public policy interest in protecting injured con-
sumers.51 The court felt that it was important to place the burden of
loss on the party who creates the risks, invites purchases, or profits
from the sale of the product.52 Strict liability was intended to be " 'a
fixed under a strict and comprehensive statutory scheme, and was not subjected to the
sympathies of jurors whose compassion for fellow employees often led to high recov-
ery. This trade-off between employer and employee promoted the fundamental pur-
pose of the Act, which was to afford protection to employees by providing them with
prompt and equitable compensation for their injuries.
384 N.E.2d 353, 356 (111. 1978) (citations omitted).
48. Id.
49. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 95, at 677.
50. 210 N.E.2d 182 (Il1. 1965). In Suvada, the manufacturer of a component part was held
strictly liable to a subpurchaser for damages resulting from the defective condition of the part. Id.
at 186. The court extended liability in tort for a defective product to the manufacturer, the seller,
the contractor, the supplier, one who holds himself out to be the manufacturer, the assembler of
parts, and the manufacturer of a component part. Id. at 185. Further, the court noted that lack of
privity of contract is no longer a defense in a tort action against any party liable for the defective
condition of a product. Id.
The Suvada court embraced the position expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which
states the following:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his prod-
uct, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964).
51. Suvada, 210 N.E.2d at 186.
52. Id.
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liability based upon the placing into commerce of a product which if
defective, is likely to be unreasonably dangerous under normal
use' -" and should "'trace back to the originally responsible
party.' 9954
Three theories have commonly been used to support the applica-
tion of strict liability in product cases.5 5 First, the one who puts the
product into the stream of commerce is in the best position to bear
the cost of accidents caused by defective products."' Furthermore,
the manufacturer can shift the cost of accidents to consumers by
charging higher prices. 7 Second, strict liability helps to deter the
manufacture of defective products. 8 Third, it is especially difficult
and expensive for plaintiffs to prove negligence in the sale and man-
ufacture of a defective product.59
D. Application of the Principles of Indemnity, Contribution, and
Strict Liability by Illinois Courts
1. The No-Contribution Rule
The rule against contribution among tortfeasors originated in
1799 in the case of Merryweather v. Nixan.60 In Merryweather, two
defendants acted together in the conversion of the plaintiff's prop-
erty.6' The defendant who was held accountable for the entire judg-
ment sought contribution from his partner in the endeavor."2 The
court rejected his claim for contribution, holding that contribution
[lit seems obvious that public interest in human life and health, the invitations and
solicitations to purchase the product and the justice of imposing the loss on the one
creating the risk and reaping the profit are present and . . . compelling in cases in-
volving . . . products, where the defective condition makes them unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user.
Id.
53. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams Mach. & Tool Co., 338 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Il1. 1975).
This case was a strict liability indemnity case in which the court refused to apply principles of
active/passive indemnity and concluded that the manufacturer of a defective product could not
shift the burden of loss to a subsequent commercial user of the product. Id.
54. Id. (quoting 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A(4)(b)(i)).
55. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 98, at 692.
56. Id. at 692-93.
57. Id. at 693.
58. Id. Some argue, however, that strict liability may not induce any greater standard of care
than simple negligence and that the major impact of strict liability is a chilling effect upon the
development of new products. Id.
59. Id.
60. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
61. Id. at 1337.
62. Id.
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between two parties liable in tort was impermissible. 63 However, at
the time that Merryweather was decided, the term "tort" only re-
ferred to an intentional act;" ' it did not encompass acts of
negligence. 65
When American courts originally embraced the no-contribution
rule, they restricted its application to cases involving defendants
who sought contribution from each other after the commission of an
intentional act. 66 Eventually, however, a vast majority of American
courts extended the no-contribution rule to all tort cases. 67 The Illi-
nois Supreme Court adopted the no-contribution rule in 1856.68
63. Id.
64. Alley, supra note 14, at 635.
65. See Theodore W. Reath, Contribution between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence -
Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARv. L. REV. 176 (1898). Reath states:
In considering the facts of Merryweather v. Nixan, and in applying that decision, it is
important to bear in mind that the meaning of the word "tort" at the time of the
decision in 1799 was limited and narrow. None of the early writers, such as Bacon,
accurately defined torts, but the actions which they treat as torts are practically all
actions such as batteries, slanders, etc., which were, of course, wilful or intentional
wrongs. At that time the word "tort" had not come to be applied to the vast number
of quasi delicts now known and classified as actions sounding in tort and arising out
of mere negligence or unintentional injury.
Id. at 178.
66. KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 50, at 337; see Hunt v. Lane, 9 Ind. 248 (1857); Peck v.
Ellis, 2 Johns. Ch. 131 (N.Y. Ch. 1816); Rhea v. White, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 121 (1859); Atkins v.
Johnson, 43 Vt. 78 (1870).
67. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 50, at 337.
The great majority of our courts proceeded to apply [the no-contribution rule] gener-
ally, and refused to permit contribution even where independent, although concurrent,
negligence had contributed to a single result. Until the 1970s - for a period of more
than a century - only nine American jurisdictions came to the contrary conclusion,
allowing contribution without legislation.
Id.;'see also Reath, supra note 65, at 177 ("It is singularly unfortunate, and has led to misunder-
standing, that Merryweather v. Nixan should have been continually treated as stating the 'general
rule.' As a matter of fact that case states not the rule, but the exception.").
68. See Nelson v. Cook, 17 111. 443, 449 (1856) ("The principle laid down in Merryweather v.
Nixan . . . that there is no right of contribution as between tort-feasors ...has been, and still
is, recognized as unquestionable law."); see also Skala v. Lehon, 175 N.E.2d 832, 833 (Ill. 1931)
("It is true, as a general rule, that the right of contribution does not exist as between joint tort-
feasors where there is concerted action in the commission of the wrong."); Consolidated Ice Mach.
Co. v. Keifer, 25 N.E. 799, 802 (II1. 1890) ("There can .. .be no apportionment of damages, as
between the several parties whose negligent acts and conduct have contributed to the injury, nor
can one of the wrongdoers compel contribution from the others."); Johnson v. Chicago & Pac.
Elevator Co., 105 I11. 462, 468 (1882) ("[T]here is no right of contribution between wrongdo-
ers."). But see Farwell v. Becker, 21 N.E. 792 (I11. 1889) (holding that the rule prohibiting contri-
bution was limited to contribution among intentional wrongdoers or wrongdoers who knew that
their acts were unlawful). In Farwell, a group of creditors negligently converted the chattel of a
third person. Id. at 792. The court held that the one creditor who was forced to satisfy the entire
judgment was entitled to contribution in equal shares from the other creditors. Id. at 794.
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2. Miller v. DeWitt: Indemnity against an Employer Upheld in
Illinois
Although Illinois refused to allow contribution between
tortfeasors, indemnity was available to tortfeasors seeking to place
the responsibility for payment of a plaintiff's damages elsewhere. In
Miller v. DeWitt, 9 the plaintiffs sustained injuries when the roof of
a school gymnasium on which they were working collapsed.7 0 The
plaintiffs sued the supervising architects and the school district
which, in turn, filed a third-party indemnity action against the
plaintiffs' employer. 7' The court rejected the employer's contention
that the third-party action was precluded by sections five and eleven
of the Workers' Compensation Act. 72 The court held that an ac-
tively negligent employer could be liable for indemnity to a third
party who was not actively negligent, notwithstanding the limita-
tions established by the Workers' Compensation Act.73 The court
was concerned that "unless a third party who has not been guilty of
active negligence can succeed in an action against an employer who
has been guilty of active negligence, the third 'party will be made to
bear the ultimate burden of a loss which should fall on the em-
ployer." '74 In Miller, the amount of the employer's liability was not
limited by the amount of the workers' compensation benefits paid by
the employer.75
3. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co.: The
Abolition of the No-Contribution Rule in Illinois
The no-contribution rule was abolished by the Illinois Supreme
Court in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery
69. 226 N.E.2d 630 (111. 1967).
70. Id. at 633.
71. Id. The architects and the school district sought indemnity from the employer pursuant to
the doctrine of active/passive indemnity. Id. at 640.
72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 138.5(a), 138.11 (1991) (820 ILCS 35/5(A), 35/11 (1992)).
The employer argued that since an employer's only responsibility to an injured employee is the
payment of workers' compensation benefits, allowing a third-party action would make the em-
ployer indirectly liable in tort to the employee even though it could not be liable directly. Miller,
226 N.E.2d at 640.
73. Miller, 226 N.E.2d at 641-42. The court stated that "the argument in favor of allowing a
third party who was not actively negligent to obtain indemnification from an employer who was
actively negligent is the better view." Id. at 640.
74. Id. at 641.
75. Id. at 640.
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Co.7" The plaintiff in Skinner was an employee injured in an acci-
dent involving an injection molding machine.77 He brought an action
against the manufacturer of the machine under a strict liability the-
ory. 8 The defendant manufacturer then filed a third-party action
seeking contribution from the employer.7 9 The Illinois Supreme
Court held that a defendant manufacturer sued in strict liability
had a right of contribution against the injured worker's employer
whose conduct contributed to the worker's injuries.80
This decision represented a major departure from previous Illinois
law, which had staunchly followed the principle laid down in Mer-
ryweather v. Nixan81 that there is no right of contribution among
tortfeasors8 2 Prior to Skinner, the only possible right a tortfeasor
could have exercised against another tortfeasor was indemnity. 83
The principal objection to permitting contribution among tortfeasors
was the use of the courts for the benefit of wrongdoers.84 The Skin-
ner court held that although this objection may have had merit
when Merryweather was decided,85 it was no longer proper support
for the no-contribution rule. 6 The court found no valid reason for
the continued existence of the no-contribution rule and recognized
that there were many compelling arguments against it. 7 The court
noted its agreement with Dean Prosser that
"[tihere is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the
entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally, unintention-
ally responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone, according to the accident
76. 374 N.E.2d 437 (111. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978).




81. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
82. See Carver v. Grossman, 305 N.E.2d 161 (II1. 1973); Reese v. Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R., 303 N.E.2d 382 (II1. 1973); Muhlbauer v. Kruzel, 234 N.E.2d 790 (111. 968);
Miller v. DeWitt, 226 N.E.2d 630 (111. 967); Chicago & Ill. Midland Ry. v. Evans Constr. Co.,
208 N.E.2d 573 (II1. 1965); John Grifliths & Son Co. v. National Fireproofing Co., 141 N.E. 739
(111. 923); Johnson v. Chicago & Pac. Elevator Co., 105 Ill. 462 (1882).
83. See, e.g., Carver, 305 N.E.2d at 162-63.
84. Reese, 303 N.E.2d at 386.
85. At that time, the term "tortfeasors" meant intentional wrongdoers. That meaning was not
as broad as it is now that the term includes negligence and strict liability tortfeasors. Skinner v.
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of a successful levy of execution, the existence of liability insurance, the
plaintiff's whim or spite, or his collusion with the other wrongdoer, while the
latter goes scot free."88
Skinner also stirred debate because it allowed a strict liability de-
fendant to seek contribution from another party. Skinner mitigated
the positive public policy effects of strict liability in product cases
because it divided the liability for injuries caused by defective prod-
ucts.89 It allocated the loss by permitting a strictly liable manufac-
turer who placed a defective product into the stream of commerce to
receive contribution from a party not involved in the product's
manufacture. 90
In Skinner, the court decided that the employer's immunity pro-
vided by the Workers' Compensation Act did not operate as a bar to
the contribution action. The Workers' Compensation Act clearly
states that the compensation provided in the Act shall be the full
measure of the employer's responsibility when an employee is in-
jured.9 Nevertheless, the court placed no limitations on the amount
for which the employer could be liable in contribution. Instead, the
court mandated that "ultimate liability for plaintiff's injuries be ap-
portioned on the basis of the relative degree to which the defective
product and the employer's conduct proximately caused them."92
4. The Illinois Contribution Act
Less than two years after the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in
Skinner, the Illinois legislature passed the Contribution Act. 93 This
Act provides that a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata
share of the common liability9" to the plaintiff has a right to contri-
bution from another tortfeasor who is subject to liability in tort to
the plaintiff for the same injury. 5 No tortfeasor is required to pay
88. Id. (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 50,
at 307 (4th ed. 1971)).
89. See Susan H. Maynard, Note, Skinner v. Reed-Prentice: The Application of Contribution
to Strict Product Liability, 12 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 165, 175 (1978).
90. Id.
91. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.11 (1991) (820 ILCS 35/11 (1992)).
92. Skinner, 374 N.E.2d at 442.
93. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, paras. 301-305 (1991) (740 ILCS 100/1-100/5 (1992)).
94. A tortfeasor's pro rata share of the common liability is based on the relative degree to
which the conduct of the tortfeasor proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries. Id. para. 303 (740
ILCS 100/3 (1992)). See Doyle v. Rhodes, 461 N.E.2d 382, 389 (I1. 1984).
95. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302(a) & (b) (740 ILCS 100/2(a) & (b) (1992)). A
tortfeasor can only have a right to contribution from another tortfeasor if it is jointly and severally
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contribution in excess of his own pro rata share of the common lia-
bility unless one of the joint tortfeasors is insolvent or his portion is
otherwise uncollectible.96 In that case, the remaining tortfeasors
must pay, in their proportionate share, the insolvent tortfeasor's por-
tion of the damages.97
The operation of the Contribution Act was modified by passage of
section 2-1117 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure.98 This section
altered the doctrine of joint and several liability in Illinois.99 Before
this section was passed, all defendants who were liable to the plain-
tiff were jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff's damages.
Thus, if the party most responsible for the plaintiff's injury could
not satisfy the judgment, a wealthy defendant who was only margin-
ally negligent might be forced to pay all of the plaintiff's damages.
Section 2-1117 provides that a defendant who is liable for less
than twenty-five percent of the total fault attributable to the plain-
tiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third-party de-
fendant who could have been sued by the plaintiff shall only be sev-
erally liable for the plaintiff's damages (i.e., only liable for his pro
rata share).' 00 Therefore, a defendant is jointly and severally liable
for all of the plaintiff's damages only when a defendant's fault is
determined to be twenty-five percent or greater. 1 1
Courts originally interpreted the Contribution Act as having
changed the right to contribution as it was created under Skinner.''
In Skinner, the court decided that "[t]he fact that the employee's
action against the employer is barred by the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act would not preclude the [joint tortfeasor's] third-party ac-
tion against the employer for indemnification and should not serve
to bar its action for contribution." 0 3 However, an Illinois appellate
court, in Lake Motor Freight, Inc. v. Randy Trucking, Inc.,' 04 de-
liable to the plaintiff. See Walsh & Doherty, supra note 29, at 124. "It makes no sense for a
defendant who is not jointly liable to pursue a contribution action because, by definition, that
defendant is not liable for 'more than its share' of damages." Id.
96. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 303 (740 1LCS 100/3 (1992)).
97. Id.
98. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1117 (1991) (735 1LCS 52-1117 (1992)).
99. Section 2-1117 applies to cases involving bodily injury, death, or property damage based
on negligence, or product liability based on strict liability. Id.
100. Id. All defendants found liable, however, remain jointly and severally liable for the plain-
tiff's medical expenses. Id.
101. Id.
102. 374 N.E.2d 437 (I1. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
103. Id. at 443 (citations omitted).
104. 455 N.E.2d 222 (111. App. Ct. 1983).
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cided that the Illinois legislature's choice of wording in the Contri-
bution Act (i.e., "subject to liability in tort ' 10 5) changed the right to
contribution. The court decided that when an inj.ry is compensable
under the Workers' Compensation Act, the employer is not "subject
to liability in tort" for the employee's injury.' 06 Thus, the employer
is not liable for contribution under the Contribution Act. 07 The
court based its decision on the theory that the liability of the em-
ployer is not liability in tort, but liability imposed by law "'in the
nature of an implied contract by reason of the relation of the parties
or the existence of an obligation or duty.' "1108
5. Doyle v. Rhodes: Skinner Reaffirmed
In Doyle v. Rhodes,0 9 the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the
approach taken by the appellate court in Lake Motor Freight."10
The plaintiff in Doyle was a highway flagman who was injured
when he was struck by an automobile driven by the defendant."'
After the plaintiff sued the defendant, the defendant filed a third-
party complaint for contribution against the highway contractor
that employed the plaintiff, alleging that the contractor had violated
provisions of the Road Construction Injuries Act." 2 The employer
argued that the Contribution Act did not apply because the em-
ployer was not "subject to liability in tort" to its employee and
therefore no recovery could be had against the employer." 13
The Illinois Supreme Court found that the Contribution Act was
intended to codify, not modify, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision
in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co., 4
which had allowed a contribution action against an employer for
injuries to its employee." 5 The Doyle court held that an employer is
"subject to liability in tort" to an injured employee and thus liable
105. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302(a) (1991) (740 ILCS 10/ 2 (a) (1992)).
106. 455 N.E.2d at 224.
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting Keller v. Industrial Comm'n, 183 N.E.2d 237 (I11. 1932)).
109. 461 N.E.2d 382 (II1. 1984).
110. 455 N.E.2d 222 (I11. App. Ct. 1983).
111. 461 N.E.2d at 384.
112. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, para. 314.1 (1991) (430 ILCS 15/1 (1992)).
113. Doyle, 461 N.E.2d at 384.
114. 374 N.E.2d 437 (111. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
115. Doyle, 461 N.E.2d at 385-86. "The phrase 'subject to liability in tort' [is not] inconsistent
with the legislature's expressed desire to codify the Skinner decision . I..." Id. at 388.
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in contribution to a third party sued by that employee.11 The court
explained that although the exclusive remedy provision of section
five of the Workers' Compensation Act provides the employer with a
defense against any action that may be asserted by its employee, the
defense is an affirmative one subject to being raised and proven. 17'
In other words, the employer immunity provided by sections five and
eleven of the Workers' Compensation Act is only a procedural bar
to a direct suit by an employee against his employer. Under this
rationale, the plaintiff still maintains a substantive cause of action
against his employer.
The court decided that the focus of the Contribution Act is the
culpability of the parties rather than the precise legal means by
which the plaintiff is ultimately able to get compensation from a
defendant. 8 It interpreted the intent of the contribution statute to
"reach anyone who is culpable regardless of whether they have been
immunized from a direct tort action by some special defense or priv-
ilege." 119 On that basis, the court held that according to the Contri-
bution Act, the employer's immunity from direct suit in tort by its
employee as plaintiff is not a bar to a claim for contribution against
it by a defendant held liable to such a plaintiff. 20 Therefore, a
third-party defendant is liable for contribution as long as the plain-
116. Id. at 385-86.
117. Id. at 386. The court suggested that if the employer did not raise the immunity as an
affirmative defense, the defense was waived. Id.
118. Id. at 388.
119. Id. at 386. Illinois courts reached the same result when dealing with the conflict between
the right of contribution and the parent-child and the interspousal immunities. (Note that spousal
immunity no longer exists in Illinois. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1001 (1991) (750 ILCS 65/1
(1992)).) See Hartigan v. Beery, 470 N.E.2d 571, 572 (I11. App. Ct. 1984) ("This court has
recently noted that Illinois courts, when balancing the right of contribution with a conflicting
immunity, have generally found that the law of contribution must prevail."); Moon v. Thompson,
469 N.E.2d 365, 368 (II1. App. Ct. 1984) ("[W]e do not believe that the rationale underlying the
parental tort immunity doctrine was sufficient to prevail over the allowance of an action for contri-
bution in the case at bar."); Larson v. Buschkamp, 435 N.E.2d 221 (!11. App. Ct. 1982) (holding
that parent-child immunity did not bar a third-party action for contribution against an injured
minor plaintiff's parent whose alleged negligence in operating a car allegedly contributed to the
minor's injuries); Wirth v. City of Highland Park, 430 N.E.2d 236, 252 (111. App. Ct. 1981)
(holding that interspousal tort immunity did not preclude a third-party action for contribution
against the plaintiff's spouse even though the plaintiff was barred from suing her spouse directly).
But see Duensing v. Tripp, 596 F. Supp. 389, 392 (S.D. I11. 1984) (holding that there was no right
of contribution against a minor's mother because Illinois does not recognize the tort of negligent
supervision, and thus the mother was not subject to liability in tort). Note further that two Illinois
courts have held that contribution may not be sought from a governmental unit when sovereign
immunity is involved. Martin v. Lion Uniform Co., 536 N.E.2d 736, 743 (111. App. Ct. 1989);
Stephens v. Cozadd, 512 N.E.2d 812, 816 (11. App. Ct. 1987).
120. Doyle, 461 N.E.2d at 388.
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tiff has a substantive cause of action against the third-party defend-
ant, thus making him "subject to liability in tort." '121
In Doyle, as in Skinner, no limitations were placed on the amount
the employer could be required to contribute other than its statutory
"pro rata share."'1 2 2 The Doyle court did note in its holding that
some "accommodation" between the Workers' Compensation Act
and the Contribution Act may be necessary. 12 3 However, the court
appeared only to address the employer's right of recoupment under
the Workers' Compensation Act.' 2 4 Other than raising this caution-
ary signal, the Illinois Supreme Court declined to address the issue
and left employers liable for contribution limited only by their rela-
tive culpability.
E. Minnesota Law: The Model for Kotecki
The vast majority of other states (forty-five) do not allow a con-
tribution action against an employer brought by a defendant sued in
tort by an injured employee. 25 The rationale for this position is that
121. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302(a) (740 ILCS 100/2(a) (1992)).
122. See id. paras. 302(b), 303 (740 ILCS 100/2(b), 100/3 (1992)).
123. Doyle, 461 N.E.2d at 389.
124. Id. If an employee injured at work also recovers damages from a separate tort action
against a third party arising from the injury, the employer has a right to recoup the statutory
benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act that it paid to the employee. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
48, para. 138.5(b) (1991) (820 ILCS 35/5(b) (1992)). See supra notes 42 and 43 for the perti-
nent wording of this section.
125. See Kessler v. Bowie Mach. Works, 501 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1974) (South Dakota law);
Stringfellow v. Reed, 739 F. Supp. 324 (S.D. Miss. 1990); O'Brien v. Tri-State Oil Tool Indus.,
Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1119 (S.D. W. Va. 1983); Paul Krebs & Assocs. v. Matthews & Fritts Constr.
Co., 356 So. 2d 638 (Ala. 1978); Lake v. Construction Mach., Inc., 787 P.2d 1027 (Alaska 1990);
Desert Steel Co. v. Superior Court, 526 P.2d 1077 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974); W.M. Bashlin Co. v.
Smith, 643 S.W.2d 526 (Ark. 1982); Witt v. Jackson, 366 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1961) (en banc); Public
Serv. Co. v. District Court, 638 P.2d 772 (Colo. 1981) (en banc); Therrien v. Safeguard Mfg. Co.,
408 A.2d 273 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979); Powell v. Interstate Vendaway, Inc., 300 A.2d 241 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1972); Houdaille Indus. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1979); J.R. Mabbett & Son,
Inc. v. Ripley, 365 S.E.2d 155 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); Hanagami v. China Airlines, Ltd., 688 P.2d
1139 (Haw. 1984); Elcona Homes Corp. v. McMillan Bloedell, Ltd., 475 N.E.2d 713 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1985); Mermigis v. Servicemaster Indus., Inc., 437 N.W.2d 242 (Iowa 1989); Houk v. Ar-
row Drilling Co., 439 P.2d 146 (Kan. 1968); Gros v. Steen Prod. Serv., Inc., 197 So. 2d 356 (La.
Ct. App. 1967); Roberts v. American Chain & Cable Co., 259 A.2d 43 (Me. 1969); Baltimore
Transit Co. v. State, 39 A.2d 858 (Md. 1944); Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446
N.E.2d 1033 (Mass. 1983); Downie v. Kent Prods., Inc., 362 N.W.2d 605 (Mich. 1984); State ex
rel. Hillyard Chem. Co. v. Schoenlaub, 610 S.W.2d 957 (Mo. 1981); Cordier v. Stetson-Ross,
Inc., 604 P.2d 86 (Mont. 1979); Vangreen v. Interstate Mach. & Supply Co., 246 N.W.2d 652
(Neb. 1976); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Schupbach, 561 P.2d 450 (Nev. 1977); William H. Field
Co. v. Nuroco Woodwork, Inc., 348 A.2d 716 (N.H. 1975); Beal v. Southern Union Gas Co., 304
P.2d 566 (N.M. 1956); Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 75 S.E.2d 768 (N.C.
1953); Barry v. Baker Elec. Coop., Inc., 354 N.W.2d 666 (N.D. 1984); Ramos v. Browning Ferris
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the employer is not liable to the employee in tort because of the
immunity provided to employers by workers' compensation stat-
utes.1"6 In these jurisdictions, the employer cannot be a joint
tortfeasor and therefore cannot be liable for contribution.1 27
Only New York allows a defendant unlimited contribution from
negligent employers. 28 Minnesota also provides an exception to the
general rule. There, employers may be liable for contribution only to
the extent of their workers' compensation liability.129 The Illinois
Supreme Court used the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in
Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp. 30 as a model for its decision in
Kotecki v. Cyclops Welding Corp. Therefore, a discussion of Lam-
bertson and the decisions that follow it is of particular interest to
Illinois observers attempting to analyze the impact of Kotecki.
Originally, Minnesota was in line with the majority position. For
example, in Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 3 an
employee was killed by contact with power lines. 3 2 The decedent's
dependents recovered workers' compensation benefits from the dece-
dent's employer and then filed a wrongful death action against the
power company. 3 The power company brought a third-party action
seeking contribution from the decedent's employer."3 The court af-
firmed the dismissal of the third-party complaint, holding that the
Workers' Compensation Act barred a defendant from seeking con-
tribution from an employer where the concurrent negligence of the
Indus. of South Jersey, Inc., 510 A.2d 1152 (N.J. 1986); Taylor v. Academy Iron & Metal Co.,
522 N.E.2d 464 (Ohio 1988); Harter Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Harris, 592 P.2d 526 (Okla. 1979);
Roberts v. Gray's Crane & Rigging, Inc., 697 P.2d 985 (Or. Ct. App. 1985); Beary v. Container
Gen. Corp. 568 A.2d 190 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); lorio v. Chin, 446 A.2d 1021 (R.I. 1982); Knight
v. Autumn Co., 245 S.E.2d 602 (S.C. 1978); Rupe v. Durbin Durco, Inc., 557 S.W.2d 742 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1976), overruled on other grounds by Crosslin v. Alsup, 594 S.W.2d 379 (Tenn. 1980);
Varela v. American Petrofina Co., 658 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1983); Curtis v. Harmon Elec., Inc., 552
P.2d 117 (Utah 1976); Hiltz v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 497 A.2d 748 (Vt. 1985); Virginia
Elec. & Power Co. v. Wilson, 277 S.E.2d 149 (Va. 1981); Glass v. Stahl Specialty Co., 652 P.2d
948 (Wash. 1982) (en banc); Jenkins v. Sabourin, 311 NW.2d 600 (Wis. 1981); Mauch v. Stan-
ley Structures, Inc., 641 P.2d 1247 (Wyo. 1982).
126. I LARSON, supra note I, § 76.20.
127. 1 id.
128. See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 282 N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1972).
129. Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 257 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 1977). The Minnesota approach
was adopted by statute in Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.690(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1983); and Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 72-209(2) (1989).
130. 257 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 1977).
131. 104 N.W.2d 843 (Minn. 1960).
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employer and a third party caused injury to the employee. 135 The
court reasoned that because workers' compensation statutes re-
present the sole liability of the employer to the employee, there can
be no common liability shared by the employer and the third
party."3 6 Therefore, since there can be no right of contribution with-
out common liability, there is no basis for a right of contribution.
37
In 1977, in Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp.,' 38 the Minnesota Su-
preme Court rejected the reasoning of the Hendrickson court. In
Lambertson, the plaintiff suffered a crushed left forearm in a work-
related accident involving a press brake. 39 After receiving workers'
compensation benefits from his employer, the plaintiff brought an
action in tort against the manufacturer of the press brake. 4 ° The
manufacturer, in turn, sought contribution from the plaintiff's em-
ployer, alleging that the employer was negligent in declining to in-
stall new safety devices in the press brake that were offered to the
employer by the manufacturer prior to the accident.' 4'
The court ruled that the best way to balance the competing inter-
ests 42 was to allow the manufacturer contribution from the em-
ployer limited by the employer's workers' compensation liability to
the employee.' 4 3 The court deemed this approach the most equitable
approach because it allowed the third party limited contribution
135. Id. at 849.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 257 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 1977). See Michael K. Steenson, The Anatomy of Products Lia-
bility in Minnesota: Principles of Loss Allocation, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 243, 285-309
(1980), for an excellent discussion of Lambertson.
139. 257 N.W.2d at 682.
140. Id. The jury found all parties negligent to the following degrees: Plaintiff- 15 %; Cincin-
nati Corp. (manufacturer) - 25%; Hutchinson (employer) - 60%. Judgment was entered
against the manufacturer for $34,000, the full amount of the verdict, less 15% due to the plain-
tiff's comparative negligence. Id. at 683.
141. Id.
142. The court described these interests as follows:
In summary, the interests of the respective parties in the workers' compensation
system are . . . as follows: The employer has a primary interest in limiting his pay-
ment for employee injury to the workers' compensation schedule and a secondary in-
terest in receiving reimbursement when a third party has caused him to incur obliga-
tions to his employee. The employee has a primary interest in receiving full workers'
compensation benefits and, to the extent a third party has caused him injury, a com-
mon-law recovery from that third party.
In contrast, the third party's interest is that of any other co-tortfeasor - to limit its
liability to no more than its established fault.
Id. at 685 (citation omitted).
143. Id. at 689.
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while still preserving the employer's interest in limiting its liability
to the workers' compensation benefits paid.14 The court reasoned
that there could be a right of contribution against an employer be-
cause, although there was no common liability in tort, the employer
and the third party were both liable to the plaintiff for his injuries,
the third party in tort, and the employer by statute.1 5
One major consequence of the Lambertson decision is that it
placed the weighty burden of preserving the employer's immunity
from tort actions on a third party who may only be marginally cul-
pable for the plaintiff's injuries. The potential for inequity under the
Lambertson rule was clearly illustrated in Hahn v. Tri-Line Farm-
ers Co-op." 6 In Hahn, the plaintiff sustained injuries while moving
a grain auger manufactured by Hutchinson Wil-Rich, Inc. (Hutch-
inson). 4 7 Hutchinson brought a third-party action for contribution
against the plaintiff's employer, Tri-Line Farmers Co-op (Tri-Line).
The jury awarded the plaintiff $2,197,918, finding that the em-
ployer, Tri-Line, was ninety-five percent at fault, the plaintiff was
two percent at fault, and the manufacturer, Hutchinson, was only
three percent at fault.'" Nevertheless, because the employer's con-
tribution liability was limited by the amount of workers' compensa-
tion benefits he paid the employee, 4 9 Hutchinson was forced to pay
damages of $1,610,515, even though the jury had found that its con-
duct accounted for only three percent of the fault for the plaintiff's
injuries.150
Although Lambertson decided that a limit would be placed on the
employer's contribution liability, it did not address how the loss
should be apportioned between the employer, the employee, and the
third-party tortfeasor.' 5' The Minnesota Supreme Court developed
a procedure for this apportionment in the case of Johnson v. Raske
Building Systems, Inc.151 There, the court specified that the original
144. Id. The court stated that any further reform must come from the legislature. Id.
145. Id. at 688.
146. 478 N.W.2d 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
147. Id. at 519.
148. Id.
149. The employer had paid $543,445 in workers' compensation benefits to the plaintiff, which
represented the employer's maximum liability for contribution. Id.
150. Id. Hutchinson's proportionate share of the damages, equal to its percentage share of the
fault, was only $65,938. Id. at 520.
15 1. David C. Bohrer, Northern Exposure: Minnesota Solutions to Unanswered Kotecki Ques-
tions, 80 ILL. B.J. 118, 119 (1992).
152. 276 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1979). In this case, the plaintiff's decedent, an employee of N.H.
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defendant should first pay the entire verdict to the plaintiff.' 3 The
employer should then pay contribution to the original defendant in
an amount proportionate to its percentage of negligence, but not to
exceed the amount of workers' compensation benefits payable to the
employee. 54 The employee should then reimburse the employer for
the compensation benefits paid.155 Since the amount of reimburse-
ment to the employer was exactly equal to the amount of contribu-
tion paid by the employer, the effective result was that "no money
[would] change hands."' 58 Thus, the result in Johnson was consis-
tent with the intent of Lambertson. 5 This result was also consistent
with the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act'5 8 as it existed at
that time.
However, in 1976, the Minnesota legislature amended the Minne-
sota Workers' Compensation Act to allow a reduction in the amount
of reimbursement the employee was to pay to the employer.' 59 This
Sandberg Erection Co., died in a work-related accident on a construction site where Raske Build-
ing Systems, Inc. and H.K. Ferguson were general contractors. Id. at 79-80. The decedent's bene-
ficiaries received $41,000 in workers' compensation benefits and then brought a wrongful death
action against the general contractors, alleging negligence. Id. at 80. The jury set the plaintiff's
damages at $105,000 and found the plaintiff's decedent 5% negligent, the employer 40% negli-
gent, and the general contractors 55% negligent. Id.




157. The Lambertson court decided that the amount of contribution was limited to the lesser of
either the percentage of the judgment owed or the employer's workers' compensation liability.
Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 257 N.W.2d 679, 689 (Minn. 1977).
158. The Act provided in pertinent part:
The proceeds of all actions for damages or settlement thereof under section 176.061,
received by the injured employee ...shall be divided as follows:
(a) After deducting the reasonable cost of collection, including but not limited to
attorneys fees and burial expenses in excess of the statutory liability, then
(b) One-third of the remainder shall in any event be paid to the injured employee or
his dependent, without being subject to any right of subrogation.
(c) Out of the balance remaining, the employer shall be reimbursed for all compensa-
tion paid under chapter 176.
(d) Any balance remaining shall be paid to the employee or his dependents, and shall
be a credit to the employer for any compensation which employer is obligated to pay,
but has not been paid, and for any compensation that such employer shall be obli-
gated to make in the future.
MINN. STAT, § 176.061(6) (Supp. 1975).
159. The 1976 amendment reads as follows:
Out of the balance remaining, the employer shall be reimbursed in an amount equal
to all compensation paid under chapter 176 to the employee or his dependents by the
employer less the product of the costs deducted under clause (a) divided by the total
proceeds received by the employee or his dependents from the other party multiplied
by all compensation paid by the employer to the employee or his dependents.
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reduction was designed to reimburse the employee for a percentage
of the amount of attorneys' fees and costs spent in the employee's
tort action. 160 As one court explained, "The purpose of this provision
is to ensure that those benefitted by the recovery share equitably in
the cost of obtaining that recovery."'' This amendment created the
question of whether an employer's contribution liability should be
equal to the amount of workers' compensation benefits paid to the
employee or the amount that the employer is reimbursed from the
employee after a recovery in a tort action.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in accordance with the amend-
ment, changed the scheme for apportionment of a verdict that it had
laid out in Johnson v. Raske Building Systems, Inc.'62 In Kordosky
v. Conway Fire and Safety, Inc.,'6 3 the court held that the em-
ployer's contribution liability was equal to the amount of workers'
compensation benefits that it paid to the injured employee. 64 Be-
cause of the differential between the reduced right of lien recovery
under the 1976 amendment and the need to pay the full amount of
compensation as contribution, the employer lost money in the ex-
change.'6 5 The court noted that although its result did not "fully
MINN. STAT. § 176.061(6)(c) (1992).
160. Kordosky v. Conway Fire & Safety, Inc., 304 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1981).
161. Cronen v. Wegdahl Coop. Elevator Ass'n, 278 N.W.2d 102, 104 (Minn. 1979).
162. 276 N.W.2d 79, 81 (Minn. 1979).
163. 304 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1981).
164. Id. at 620-21. But see Horton v. Orbeth, where the court stated:
[W]hile Lambertson speaks in terms of contribution, the real impact of the decision
was the limitation of a negligent employer's right of subrogation. . . In short, contri-
bution was merely a vehicle for offsetting a negligent employer's right of subrogation.
• . . [Tihe effect of the decision . . . in Lamnbertson was to deny a negligent employer
a right of reimbursement with respect to his statutory liability to the extent of the
employer's proportionate share of the fault.
342 N.W.2d 112 (Minn. 1984). The language of the Horton court appears to support the position
that the employer's contribution liability should only be equal to the amount that it would be
reimbursed from the injured employee.
165. In Kordosky, the plaintiff sustained injuries while working at a Red Owl Store when a fire
extinguisher sold to Red Owl by Conway Fire and Safety fell off the wall and struck her on the
shoulders and neck. 304 N.W.2d at 616-17. The jury awarded $60,000 in damages to the plaintiff
and $10,000 in damages to the plaintiff's husband, finding her employer, Red Owl, 60% negligent
and Conway 40% negligent. Id. The plaintiff had already received $21,948 in workers' compensa-
tion benefits from Red Owl. Id. at 618. The court held that the payment of damages should be as
follows: Conway should pay the $70,000 verdict to the plaintiff, and Red Owl should contribute
$21,948 to Conway. Id. at 620. The difference in this case, under the 1976 amendment, is that the
plaintiff should only reimburse the employer $14,632, not the full amount of the workers' compen-
sation benefits received. Id. The employer's contribution liability is equal to the amount of work-
ers' compensation benefits that he paid the employee, not only the amount he is reimbursed from
the employee. Id. at 620-21. This leaves the employer in a situation where it loses more than just
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achieve the equitable goals that form[ed] the underpinning of Lam-
bertson," any further fine tuning would have to be done by the
legislature."' 6
Another question left open by Lambertson was how to define the
term "workers' compensation liability" in order to determine the
employer's contribution liability when, at the time of trial, the em-
ployer was still paying benefits to the injured employee. This issue
was addressed by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Wilken v. Inter-
national Harvester Co.'67 In Wilken, the plaintiff's employer paid
workers' compensation benefits for five years preceding the judg-
ment in the tort action and was required to continue paying benefits
after judgment in the tort action. 6 8 The court held that an em-
ployer's liability in contribution to a third-party tortfeasor was lim-
ited by the amount of workers' compensation benefits the employer
had paid and would pay in the future to the employee. 69 The court
reasoned that to limit the employer's contribution liability to the
amount of benefits paid prior to judgment would place an even
greater burden on the third-party tortfeasor by requiring him to pay
more than his pro rata share in order to subsidize a workers' com-
pensation system to which he was a stranger.' ° Furthermore, to do
so would fix the employer's contribution liability on the fortuity of
the timing of the trial of the tort case.' Therefore, the court de-
the amount of its liability in workers' compensation benefits. The employer pays workers' compen-
sation benefits to the employee, pays an amount equal to that in contribution to the third-party
tortfeasor, and then is reimbursed less than that amount from the employee. Id.
166. Id. at 621.
167. 363 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 1985). In Wilken, an employee of Clark Transport Co. was in-
jured while unloading a semi-truck onto a transport trailer. Id. at 765. After collecting workers'
compensation benefits from his employer for five years, the employee and his wife brought tort
actions against International Harvester, the manufacturer of the semi-truck, and Traffic Transport
Engineering, the manufacturer of the trailer. Id. The manufacturers, in turn, filed third-party
actions for contribution against the plaintiff's employer. Id. The jury awarded the plaintiff
$1,250,000, attributing 75 % of the fault to International Harvester, 5 % to Traffic Transport, and
20% to the employer, Clark Transport. Id. The employer had already paid $52,660 in workers'
compensation benefits but was still required to pay future benefits. Id. at 766. The court held that
the employer's contribution liability included not only the workers' compensation benefits that it
had paid, but also those that it would pay in the future. Id. at 767.
168. Id. at 766.
169. Id. at 767.
170. Id. at 766. By limiting the amount of the employer's liability and requiring the third-party
tortfeasor to pay the remainder of the tort judgment in excess of what the jury has determined to
be its proportionate share, the third-party tortfeasor is, in essence, being asked to pay to support
the workers' compensation system. Id.
171. Id. In other words, if the employer's contribution liability was fixed by the amount of
workers' compensation benefits paid at the time of trial, an early trial date would result in lower
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cided that the employer's contribution liability should equal the
amount that it has paid in workers' compensation benefits up until
trial plus the present value of the employer's future statutory liabil-
ity to the employee as of the date of the contribution judgment in
the tort action. 172 Thus, the contribution claim is to be paid in a
single, lump sum payment.171
Another issue addressed by the Wilken court was whether the
employers' contribution liability included supplementary benefits
paid to injured employees when their compensation fell below a cer-
tain percentage of the statewide average weekly wage. 17" The sup-
plementary benefits paid by Minnesota employers came from a spe-
cial fund financed by employers. 1 5  The court held that
supplementary benefits were not to be included in determining an
employer's contribution liability because they were "not a direct
part of any individual employer's total workers' compensation liabil-
ity to a particular employee. '176
The Illinois Supreme Court based its decision in Kotecki on the
Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Lambertson v. Cincinnati
Corp. Therefore, the foregoing discussion of Lambertson and its
progeny lends insight into the Kotecki decision.
II. SUBJECT OPINION
A. Facts and Procedure
The conflict between the Contribution Act 177 and the employer
contribution liability.
172. Id. at 767-68. The calculation of the present value of future workers' compensation bene-
fits should be done by the trial court in a special interrogatory to the jury following the entry of
judgment in the tort action. Id. at 768. See Bohrer, supra note 151, at 121.
173. Wilken, 363 N.W.2d at 768.
174. Id. at 769. In Minnesota, supplementary benefits are paid i.n two situations:
(1) when an employee has been totally disabled for a designated period and his com-
pensation rate is less than a certain percentage of the statewide average weekly wage;
and (2) when the employee is permanently and totally disabled for a designated pe-
riod and, because of a set-off for government old age or disability benefits received by
the employee, the employer has reduced his benefit payments below the designated
percentage of the statewide average weekly wage.
Id. at 768 (citations omitted).
175. Id. at 769 (citing MINN. STAT. § 176.132(3) (1984)). The employers finance the special
fund by paying a percentage of all workers' compensation benefits paid to injured employees. Id.
(citing MINN. STAT. § 176.129 (1984)).
176. Id.
177. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, paras. 300 to 305 (1991).
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immunity provided by the Workers' Compensation Act 178 was re-
cently examined by the Illinois Supreme Court in Kotecki v. Cy-
clops Welding Corp.1" 9 In this case, the plaintiff, Mark Kotecki, was
injured while working for his employer, Carus Chemical Co.
(Carus).'8 0 Kotecki's injury occurred when he caught his hand in
the motor of an agitator that was designed, constructed, and in-
stalled by the defendant, Cyclops Welding Corp. (Cyclops). 18'
Kotecki filed a personal injury action against Cyclops on a strict
liability theory.'8 Cyclops, in turn, filed a third-party action for
contribution against Carus alleging that it was negligent in its use
and maintenance of the agitator. 83 The ad damnum clause of the
third-party complaint contained a prayer for judgment against
Carus "in an amount proportionate with the degree of fault attribu-
table to Carus' culpability."' 84 In response to the contribution ac-
tion, Carus filed a motion to strike the ad damnum clause of the
third-party complaint, alleging that section 5 of the Workers' Com-
pensation Act, when read in conjunction with the Contribution Act,
limited the amount of an employer's liability to an amount no
greater than its exposure under the Workers' Compensation Act.
8 5
The trial court denied the employer's motion to strike the ad
damnum clause 88 but certified the question for interlocutory appeal
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308.187 The Third District
Appellate Court denied the employer's petition to appeal.' 88 On fur-
ther appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the employer's petition
178. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.5(b) (1991).
179. 585 N.E.2d 1023 (Ill. 1991).
180. Id. at 1023.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1023-24.
184. Id. at 1024.
185. Id.
186. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld a contribution action without any limitation in a situa-
tion analogous to this case just six years before the trial court's decision. See Doyle v. Rhodes, 461
N.E.2d 382 (Il1. 1984).
187. Kotecki, 585 N.E.2d at 1023. Supreme Court Rule 308 provides for interlocutory appeal
by permission. It states in pertinent part:
Requests. When the trial court, in making an interlocutory order not otherwise ap-
pealable, finds that the order involves a question of law as to which there is substan-
tial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, the court shall so
state in writing, identifying the question of law involved. . . .The Appellate Court
may thereupon in its discretion allow an appeal from the order.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I IOA, para. 308(a) (1991).
188. Kotecki, 585 N.E.2d at 1024.
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for leave to appeal the denial of the motion to strike the ad damnum
clause was granted. 18 9 The question certified by the trial court and
considered by the Illinois Supreme Court as the sole issue on appeal
was "whether an employer sued as a third-party defendant in a
products liability case is liable in contribution for any amount in
excess of the employer's statutory liability under the Workers' Com-
pensation Act."1 90
B. The Court's Opinion
In an opinion written by Justice Moran, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the employer's liability in a contribution action was
limited to its liability under the Workers' Compensation statute.
The court began by discussing the decisions that first analyzed the
interplay of the Workers' Compensation Act and the Contribution
Act: Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co.' 9'
and Doyle v. Rhodes.'92 The court noted that in Doyle it decided
only that there was a right to contribution against employers.' 9a It
did not, however, decide whether that right of contribution was lim-
ited by the Workers' Compensation Act.194 The court based this as-
sertion on the Doyle court's statement that "some accommodation"
between the Contribution Act and the Workers' Compensation Act
may be necessary. 9
Cyclops took the position that the court should not rule on this
issue because the legislature was considering various pending bills
that would resolve the conflict. The court rejected this contention,
asserting that the court has a duty to act in the face of legislative
inaction. 96
189. 545 N.E.2d 112 (II1. 1989).
190. Kotecki, 585 N.E.2d at 1024.
191. 374 N.E.2d 437 (III. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
192. 461 N.E.2d 382 (I11. 1984).
193. Kotecki, 585 N.E.2d at 1025.
194. Id.
We find that Doyle does not squarely answer the question as to the amount of contri-
bution that an employer may be liable for under the Contribution Act. Rather, Doyle
stands for the proposition that a negligent employer is liable for contribution to a
third party, regardless of the Workers' Compensation Act.
Id.
195. Id.; see Doyle, 461 N.E.2d at 389 ("[W]e caution that some accommodation between
these two statutes may be in order.").
196. Kotecki, 585 N.E.2d at 1026. The court quoted the following passage from Alvis v. Ribar:
There are . . . times when there exists a mutual state of inaction in which the court
awaits action by the legislature and the legislature awaits guidance from the court.
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The court discussed the underlying conflict that exists between
the employer immunity provided by workers' compensation statutes
and the right of contribution. 197 According to the court, workers'
compensation was designed to be a tradeoff between employers and
employees. 198 Employees would be assured of receiving a certain and
prompt no-fault recovery in exchange for giving up a potentially
more lucrative action in tort.199 Employers would have to compen-
sate every employee who was injured in the course of employment
regardless of the employer's fault. In exchange, the liability of em-
ployers for employee injuries was to be limited to the benefits re-
quired by the Workers' Compensation Act.
The court noted that the operation of contribution upsets this
tradeoff. If contribution against employers is allowed, the employer
may be forced to pay the employee, through the third-party
tortfeasor, more than is required by the Workers' Compensation
Act.2 00 If contribution is not allowed, the third-party tortfeasor is
required to pay an amount in excess of what is commensurate with
his degree of fault.2 0 In other words, a stranger to the workers'
compensation tradeoff is forced to pay to support a system of which
Such a stalemate is a manifest injustice to the public. When such a stalemate exists
and the legislature has, for whatever reason, failed to act to remedy a gap in the
common law that results in injustice, it is the imperative duty of the court to repair
that injustice and reform the law to be responsive to the demands of society.
Kotecki, 585 N.E.2d at 1026 (quoting Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 896 (I11. 1981)).
197. Kotecki, 585 N.E.2d at 1026.
The underlying controversy concerning workers' compensation and contribution was
succinctly stated by the Minnesota Supreme Court: "If contribution or indemnity is
allowed, the employer may be forced to pay his employee - through the conduit of
the third-party tortfeasor - an amount in excess of his statutory workers' compensa-
tion liability. This arguably thwarts the central concept behind workers' compensa-
tion, i.e., that the employer and employee receive the benefits of a guaranteed, fixed-
schedule, nonfault recovery system, which then constitutes the exclusive liability of
the employer to his employee. If contribution or indemnity is not allowed, a third-
party stranger to the workers' compensation system is made to bear the burden of a
full common-law judgment despite possibly greater fault on the part of the employer.
This obvious inequity is further exacerbated by the right of the employer to recover
directly or indirectly from the third party the amount he has paid in compensation
regardless of the employer's own negligence. Thus, the third party is forced to subsi-
dize a workers' compensation system in a proportion greater than his own fault and at
a financial level far in excess of the workers' compensation schedule."
Id. at 1026-27 (quoting Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 257 N.W.2d 679, 684 (Minn. 1977)
(citations omitted)).
198. Id. at 1026.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1027.
201. Id.
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it is not a part.
The court then addressed what it considered the major issue of
the case - whether the employer should be forced to pay damages
based on its degree of fault, thereby losing the protection that the
Workers' Compensation Act was intended to provide.20 2 The court
examined the way this conflict is handled in other jurisdictions. It
noted that the vast majority of jurisdictions do not allow a contribu-
tion action against an employer from a defendant sued by an injured
employee.20 3 Only New York allows unlimited contribution against
employers.20 4 In Minnesota, an employer may be liable for contribu-
tion, but only to the extent of its workers' compensation liability.20 5
The Illinois Supreme Court then decided that the approach adopted
by the Minnesota Supreme Court provided the "fairest and most
equitable balance between the competing interests of the employer
and the third-party defendant. ' 20 6 On that basis, the court reversed
the decision of the trial court. It directed the trial court to strike the
ad damnum clause of the third-party complaint and to permit Cy-
clops to seek contribution from Carus in an amount not greater than
Carus's workers' compensation liability to Kotecki.20 7
C. Dissenting Opinion upon Denial of Rehearing
The Illinois Supreme Court denied the petition for rehearing the
Kotecki case on December 2, 1991. On February 5, 1992, Justice
Freeman filed a dissenting opinion upon the denial of rehearing af-
ter concurring in the original opinion of the court.208 Justice Free-
man disagreed with the court's decision that the Workers' Compen-
sation Act limits a product manufacturer's right of contribution
from employers for the workplace injuries suffered by employees. 209
This dissent was based largely on the fact that the issue addressed
by the court was one of statutory construction and legislative intent
202. Id.
203. Id.; see supra note 125 and accompanying text.
204. Kotecki, 585 N.E.2d at 1027; see supra note 128 and accompanying text.
205. Kotecki, 585 N.E.2d at 1027; see supra notes 129-45 and accompanying text (discussing
the Minnesota approach).
206. Kotecki, 585 N.E.2d at 1027. It should be noted that the Lambertson decision granted
Minnesota third-party plaintiffs a right of contribution against employers that they previously did
not have. The Kotecki decision operated to restrict a right to contribution against employers that
already existed.
207. Id. at 1028.
208. See id. (Freeman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing).
209. Id.
[Vol. 42:741
1992] KOTECKI: A JUDICIAL BALANCING ACT
(i.e., how to interpret the apparent conflict between the Workers'
Compensation Act and the Contribution Act).2 1 Freeman noted
that the Workers' Compensation Act was enacted prior to the Con-
tribution Act." 1 Therefore, Justice Freeman reasoned that
it could not have been the intent of the legislature which passed the current
Workers' Compensation Act to limit to any extent the right to contribution
from an employer of a manufacturer sued by an employee injured by a de-
fective product. It could not have been that legislature's intent to limit that
right because ...contribution did not exist in Illinois at the time of the
enactment of the original Workers' Compensation Act. 12
Thus, Freeman reasoned, it was improper for the court to give the
Workers' Compensation Act the effect of reducing Carus's right of
contribution against Cyclops. 13
Justice Freeman also pointed to the court's decision in Stephens v.
McBride" to dispel the argument that allowing unlimited contribu-
tion against an employer would allow an employee to do indirectly
what he could not do directly because of the Worker's Compensa-
tion Act. In Stephens, the court held that a plaintiff's failure to
comply with the notice-of-injury requirement of the Local Govern-
mental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act2"5 in a
lawsuit against a private individual did not bar the defendant's con-
tribution action against a municipality."16 The Stephens court rea-
210. id. at 1029.
211. Kotecki, 585 N.E.2d at 1023. The Workers' Compensation Act was enacted in 1951. The
right of contribution was first recognized in Illinois in 1977 by the Illinois Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 374 N.E.2d 437 (I11. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
212. Kotecki, 585 N.E.2d at 1029 (Freeman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing).
213. Id.
214. 455 N.E.2d 54 (I11. 1983). In Stephens, the plaintiff's motorcycle and the defendant's
automobile collided at an intersection. Id. at 55. The defendant filed a third-party action for
contribution against the Village of Maywood alleging that the village maintained shrubbery at the
corner which obstructed motorists' vision. Id. at 56. The court reasoned that the village was liable
for contribution because it was "subject to liability in tort" at the time the plaintiff was injured.
Id. at 57. "[L]iability is determined at the time of the injury out of which the right of contribu-
tion arises, and not at the time the action for contribution is brought." Id.
215. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, para. 8-102 (1991) (repealed Nov. 25, 1986).
216. Stephens, 455 N.E.2d at 59-60.
[Olur decision here does not permit the injured plaintiff to recover indirectly from the
governmental entity although he is precluded from directly recovering from it. ...
[T]he doctrine of joint and several liability allows the plaintiff to recovery fully for his
injuries from the nongovernmental defendant whether or not that defendant can re-
cover from the governmental defendant. . . . [P]laintiff gains nothing if defendant is
permitted to recover contribution from the village.
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soned that because the original defendant was jointly and severally
liable, the contribution action had no real effect on the plaintiff. 17
The true benefit of a contribution action flows to the defendant, not
to the plaintiff.
Justice Freeman then discussed the well-established rules of stat-
utory construction which require that a general statute give way to a
specific statute and that an earlier statute give way to a later-en-
acted statute.1 He reasoned that the Workers' Compensation Act
cannot be considered "specific" on the subject of employer liability
for contribution to third parties for injuries to employees, while the
Contribution Act clearly allows an unrestricted right to contribution
among all parties that are subject to liability in tort to a plaintiff.2 19
He noted that the Contribution Act, the more recently enacted
statute, places no limitation on a right of contribution against em-
ployers in cases involving workplace injuries.2 20 Therefore, he rea-
soned, the Workers' Compensation Act should not limit any rights
provided by the more specific and more recently enacted Contribu-
tion Act.
Finally, Justice Freeman stated that settling the apparent conflict
between the Workers' Compensation Act and the Contribution Act
is the responsibility of the legislature and is beyond the authority of
the judicial system.2 2
III. ANALYSIS
A. Kotecki Represents a Drastic Departure from Precedent
The Kotecki court stated that although Doyle v. Rhodes222 and its
forerunners stood for the proposition that a negligent employer is
liable for contribution to a third party, regardless of the Workers'
Compensation Act, it did not "squarely answer the question as to
217. Id.
218. Kotecki, 585 N.E.2d at 1031 (Freeman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1032.
1 believe we have usurped the proper role and authority of the Illinois legislature. In
this regard, while this court has, as the opinion in this case notes, acted in the past in
the face of legislative inaction upon an issue, I do not believe that any amount of
legislative inaction can justify a transgression of our constitutional role.
id.
222. 461 N.E.2d 382 (II1. 1984). See supra notes 109-24 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Doyle.
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the amount of contribution that an employer may be liable for
under the Contribution Act. '223 This, however, is truly a revisionist
view of the evolution of the law of contribution in the state of Illi-
nois. The question of whether contribution against a negligent em-
ployer of an injured worker should be limited or unlimited is not
really a question of first impression before the Illinois Supreme
Court. The previous decisions of the court have consistently affirmed
the principle that the measure of liability of a negligent employer in
a third-party action is its proportionate share of fault (i.e., that the
employer's liability for contribution is limited only by the employer's
degree of negligence in causing the injury).
In Miller v. DeWitt,224 the court decided that the Workers' Com-
pensation Act did not prevent or otherwise protect an actively negli-
gent employer from liability for indemnity.2 25 Because the action
was for indemnity, the employer was responsible for paying one
hundred percent of the plaintiff's damages notwithstanding the exis-
tence of the Workers' Compensation Act. In Kotecki, the manufac-
turer only sought to hold the employer liable for a pro rata share of
the plaintiff's damages commensurate with the employer's culpabil-
ity. It is reasonable to conclude that if the Workers' Compensation
Act provided no protection to employers from actions for indemnity,
it should not place a burden on a contribution action seeking to hold
employers liable for some lesser percentage of the plaintiff's dam-
ages. Therefore, Miller stands for the proposition that the amount
of the employer's liability in a third-party action for contribution
should in no way be limited by the amount of the workers' compen-
sation benefits paid. The court's staunch position in Miller never
wavered until Kotecki.226
In Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co.,227
the court, in addition to overturning the judicially created prohibi-
tion on contribution actions, held that "on these facts the governing
equitable principles require that ultimate liability for plaintiff's inju-
ries be apportioned on the basis of the relative degree to which the
defective product and the employer's conduct proximately caused
them. ' 228 Skinner involved facts almost identical to those involved
223. Kotecki, 585 N.E.2d at 1023.
224. 226 N.E.2d 630 (I11. 1967).
225. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text (discussing Miller).
226. Kotecki, 585 N.E.2d at 1023.
227. 374 N.E.2d 437 (111. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
228. Id. at 442; see supra notes 76-92 and accompanying text (discussing Skinner).
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in Kotecki. Nonetheless, the only limitation placed on the em-
ployer's liability for contribution in Skinner was the employer's pro-
portionate degree of fault. If the Skinner court intended the em-
ployer's liability to be shielded by the Workers' Compensation Act,
it would have explicitly said so. However, the Skinner court, in for-
mulating contribution in the state of Illinois, affirmatively stated
that contribution was based on the doctrine of equitable apportion-
ment. A defendant's degree of culpability was the only apparent
limitation on a defendant's liability for contribution.
In response to Skinner, the legislature passed a statute which
codified Skinner.229 The Contribution Act2 30 followed the Illinois
Supreme Court's decisions in Miller v. DeWitt"' and Skinner and
imposed no artificial limitation on the liability of a negligent third-
party defendant. The Contribution Act states only that each party
causally negligent or otherwise at fault in causing a plaintiff's inju-
ries is liable to the extent of its pro rata share of fault.232 At this
point, the legislature had every opportunity to alter Skinner and as-
sert the Workers' Compensation Act as a limitation on the law of
contribution as the court in Kotecki did. However, the legislature
did not alter the Skinner formulation in any manner.
In Lake Motor Freight, Inc. v. Randy Trucking, Inc., 2 3 an Illi-
nois appellate court held that the Contribution Act changed the re-
lationship between the right of contribution and the Workers' Com-
pensation Act that was set forth in Skinner. The Illinois Supreme
Court swiftly corrected that decision in Doyle v. Rhodes.23 4 In
Doyle, the Illinois Supreme Court had the opportunity to place a
limitation on a negligent employer's liability for contribution once
again. However, the court held that the only inquiry was whether
the employer was "subject to liability in tort. 235 Once that was de-
cided in the affirmative, the court reasoned that the employer was
liable to the extent that he was culpable.
The legislature has not amended the Contribution Act since
229. See supra notes 93-108 and accompanying text (discussing the Contribution Act).
230. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, paras. 301-305 (1991) (740 ILCS 100/1-100/5 (1992)).
231. 226 N.E.2d 630 (111. 1967).
232. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 303 (740 ILCS 100/3 (1992)).
233. 455 N.E.2d 222 (111. App. Ct. 1983); see supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Lake Motor Freight):
234. 461 N.E.2d 382 (Ill. 1984); see supra notes 109-24 and accompanying text (discussing
Doyle).
235. Kotecki, 461 N.E.2d at 387.
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Doyle. This fact alone seems to reaffirm the proposition that em-
ployers are subject to liability for contribution limited only by their
culpability. The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that " 'where a
statute has been judicially construed and the construction has not
evoked an amendment, it will be presumed that the Legislature has
acquiesced in the court's exposition of legislative intent.' "23 A
number of bills has been proposed which would repeal the Contribu-
tion Act,237 yet the Act has remained unchanged since it was first
enacted. In 1986, Senate Bill 2263 was proposed containing Senate
Amendment 12, which would have amended the Contribution Act to
prohibit third-party actions for contribution against plaintiffs' em-
ployers.238 The bill failed. The legislature had many opportunities to
do what the Kotecki court eventually did but declined to change the
Contribution Act.
The Illinois Supreme Court maintained that Kotecki was in line
with previous Illinois law. In truth, however, the court, in deciding
Kotecki, effectively rewrote section 5(b) of the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act and section 2(a) of the Contribution Act, and overruled its
decisions in Miller v. DeWitt, 39 Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division
Package Machinery Co.,24 and Doyle v. Rhodes.24'
B. The Practical Effect of Kotecki
The best way to illustrate the impact of Kotecki is to use a hypo-
thetical situation. Assume that a factory employee has been injured
while working with a piece of machinery. The employee files a
workers' compensation claim, and the employer pays the employee
$100,000 in statutory benefits. The employer has a right to recoup
these benefits if the employee recovers from a third party for his
236. Kobylanski v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 347 N.E.2d 705, 709 (Ill. 1976) (quoting People v.
Hairston, 263 N.E.2d 840, 845 (I11. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971)).
237. See H.B. 658, 86th I11. Gen. Ass. (1989-90) (on file with the DePaul Law Review); H.B.
3195, 84th Ill. Gen. Ass. (1985-86), microformed on Transcripts of the House Debates on the
Eighty-Fourth General Assembly, Roll No. 72H-70 (Illinois State Library); S.B. 2086, 84th I11.
Gen. Ass. (1985-86), microformed on Transcripts of the Senate Debates on the Eighty-Fourth
General Assembly, Roll No. 72-S51 (Illinois State Library); S.B. 636, 84th II1. Gen. Ass. (1985-
86), microformed on Transcripts of the Senate Debates on the Eighty-Fourth General Assembly,
Roll No. 72-S46 (Illinois State Library).
238. S.B. 2263, amend. 12, 84th I11. Gen. Ass., 3d Spec. Sess., I Senate J. of Ill. 1862 (1986).
239. 226 N.E.2d 630 (I11. 1967).
240. 374 N.E.2d 437 (111. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
241. 461 N.E.2d 382 (III. 1984).
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injuries. 42 The employee then brings a product liability action
against the manufacturer of the machinery. In turn, the manufac-
turer files a third-party action for contribution against the plaintiff's
employer, alleging that the employer did not properly train the em-
ployee in the usage of the machinery. The tort case is tried and the
verdict is $1,000,000 for the plaintiff. The jury finds the manufac-
turer twenty-five percent liable and the employer seventy-five per-
cent liable.
Prior to Kotecki, the employer would be required to pay $750,000
to the manufacturer. The plaintiff then would repay the employer
approximately $75,000.243 The net result would have the employer
recouping most of the benefits paid but also paying its seventy-five
percent allocation of the damages. The manufacturer would have
paid its twenty-five percent share.
The Kotecki decision drastically altered this result. Now, the
plaintiff will still be able to collect $1,000,000 from the defendant
manufacturer, but the manufacturer will only be able to collect
$100,000 from the employer in contribution even though the jury
determined that the employer was seventy-five percent liable. The
employer will still receive approximately $75,000 from the plaintiff
in recoupment of the workers' compensation benefits paid out.24
1. The Nature and Extent of the Employer's Liability under
Kotecki
In Kotecki, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the Minnesota
rule that limits an employer's liability in contribution to its workers'
compensation liability.246 Although this. appears to be a straightfor-
ward, easily applied exposition of the law, it really leaves many
242. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.5(b) (1991) (820 ILCS 35/5(b) (1992)).
243. The employer will receive less than $100,000 from the employee because the plaintiff can
reduce the amount that he repays his employer by a pro rata share of costs and expenses incurred
in the tort action against the manufacturer. Id. The plaintiff would repay only approximately
$75,000 to the employer in satisfaction of the employer's lien. In that case, the employer will have
paid out a total of $775,000. (The employer paid $750,000 in contribution and $100,000 in work-
ers' compensation benefits and recouped only $75,000 from the employee.)
244. Although this is the likely result, it is also possible that the employer will only be liable for
$75,000, the amount it recouped from the employee, in contribution. See infra notes 246-52 and
accompanying text.
245. Again, although the employee received $100,000 in benefits, he need only reimburse the
employer for approximately 75% of those benefits. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.5(b) (820
ILCS 305/5(b)).
246. Kotecki v. Cyclops Welding Corp., 585 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (I11. 1991).
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questions unanswered. One problem is that the employer's workers'
compensation liability is unclear in many circumstances. In order to
determine the amount of contribution that an employer will have to
pay, it will be necessary to calculate the employer's workers' com-
pensation liability at the time of judgment in the tort action. At that
time, there are four possible directions that the employer's workers'
compensation liability may have taken: the workers' compensation
claim may have been settled via a lump sum payment to the injured
employee; the workers' compensation claim may have been resolved
but may require future payments to be made; the workers' compen-
sation claim may still be pending for trial at the Illinois Industrial
Commission; or the employee may not have filed a workers' compen-
sation claim at all. Because Minnesota's scheme has been in place
since 1977, it is useful to look at Minnesota court decisions for guid-
ance in resolving many of Kotecki's unanswered questions.2 47
a. When the workers' compensation claim has been settled via a
lump sum payment
In the first scenario, where the employee's workers' compensation
claim was settled by a lump sum payment to the employee before
the time of judgment in the tort action, there are two main issues to
be addressed: 1) How is the employer's liability, and thus his contri-
bution liability, to be calculated?; and 2) Can a lump sum settle-
ment of a workers' compensation claim be challenged by the third-
party plaintiff as not accurately representing the employer's contri-
bution liability?
The first question is whether the employer is liable in contribution
for the total workers' compensation benefits paid out to the em-
ployee or for the amount that the employer will recover from the
employee in reimbursement. If the employer's contribution liability
is equal to the former, then the employer will actually end up pay-
ing approximately twenty-five percent more than it was liable for
under the Workers' Compensation Act.
For example, in the hypothetical situation mentioned earlier, the
employer paid the employee $100,000 in workers' compensation
benefits. Next, it paid the manufacturer $100,000 in contribution
but was only reimbursed $75,000 from the employee. Thus, the net
247. See generally Bohrer, supra note 151 (determining that Illinois may need to look to Min-
nesota decisions to resolve the issues left open in Kotecki).
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result was that the employer paid out $125,000, an amount twenty-
five percent greater than its statutory workers' compensation liabil-
ity. This consequence is not completely consistent with the policy
interest of insulating employers from having to pay more than the
amount required by the Workers' Compensation Act.2 8 It is consis-
tent, however, with the policy interest of trying to limit the amount
that the third-party tortfeasor will have to pay to protect the work-
ers' compensation system.
The Minnesota Supreme Court decided this issue by holding that
the employer is liable in contribution for the total workers' compen-
sation benefits it paid out to the employee, not just the amount the
employer is reimbursed.249 The Minnesota courts acknowledged that
the employer would lose money in the exchange but decided that
any other result would have to be achieved through the legisla-
ture.250 However, in Horton v. Orbeth, Inc.,251 the Minnesota Su-
preme Court stated that the effect of the decision in Lambertson
''was to deny a negligent employer a right of reimbursement
.... ,25 This statement supports the conclusion that the employer
is liable in contribution for only the amount that the employer will
recover from the employee in reimbursement. Thus, to some extent,
the guidance from Minnesota is conflicting. The resolution of this
question in Illinois will depend on a balancing of the protection of
employers and the manufacturer's interest in only paying its propor-
tionate share.
The second issue that arises when the workers' compensation
claim has been settled for a lump sum is whether the sum that was
paid by the employer can be challenged by the third-party plaintiff
as not being fairly representative of the value of the claim, and thus
not a true representation of the employer's contribution liability. If
the workers' compensation claim, and thus his contribution liability,
has been decided after a hearing by an arbitrator at the Illinois In-
dustrial Commission, the amount of the employer's workers' com-
pensation liability is clear. However, where the workers' compensa-
tion claim was settled for a lump sum, it is not obvious whether that
amount necessarily represents the extent of the employer's liability
248. 585 N.E.2d at 1028.
249. Kordosky v. Conway Fire & Safety, Inc., 304 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1981).
250. Id. at 620-21; see supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text (discussing Kordosky).
251. 342 N.W.2d 112 (Minn. 1984); see supra note 164 (discussing Horton).
252. 342 N.W.2d at 115.
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in contribution. If the employer's liability in contribution is fixed at
the amount of the lump sum settlement, it is almost certain that the
amount of the settlement will also represent the employer's liability
in contribution. However, the question remains whether the defend-
ant in the tort action, the third-party plaintiff, could challenge the
settlement as not adequately representing the employer's statutory
liability under the Workers' Compensation Act.
In the syllabus of its opinion in Lambertson v. Cincinnati
Corp.,253 the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that "[t]he manufac-
turer is entitled to contribution from the employer in an amount not
to exceed the compensation benefits paid or to be paid by the em-
ployer to the employee because of the accident. ' 254 Therefore, be-
cause the Kotecki decision was intended to adopt the rule espoused
in Lambertson, the almost certain answer to this question is that the
amount of the settlement would also represent the amount of the
employer's liability in contribution. Still, a danger exists in deciding
that the settlement amount fixes the employer's contribution liabil-
ity. The employer and employee have a continuing relationship.
There may be a threat that they will enter into a collusive agree-
ment to decrease the employer's workers' compensation payment.
The only way to prevent this result is to grant the third-party plain-
tiff a forum for challenging the settlement figure.
b. When the workers' compensation claim has been resolved but
requires future payments to be made
In the second scenario, where the employee's workers' compensa-
tion claim may have been resolved but may require future payments
to be made, 25 5 a variety of issues was left open by the court's deci-
sion in Kotecki. The first issue is how to calculate the amount that
the employer will be forced to pay the original defendant in contri-
bution. There are three potential methods for this calculation: limit
the employer's contribution liability to Only prejudgment payments
made to the employee; have the employer contribute to the defend-
ant as he would ordinarily pay the employee; or reduce the amount
253. 257 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 1977).
254. Id. at 681 (emphasis added).
255. For example, in a case where the employee's disability renders him wholly and perma-
nently incapable of work, the employer is required to make payments to the employee for the
duration of the employee's life. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.8(b)(2) & (f) (1991) (820 ILCS
305/8(b)(2) & (f) (1992)).
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of the future payments to present value.
The first solution was rejected with good reason by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Wilken v. International Harvester Co.256 The
Minnesota approach is designed, in part, to allow a third-party
tortfeasor some amount of contribution from a negligent employer
in order to limit the amount that the third party is required to subsi-
dize the workers' compensation system.257 To limit the employer's
contribution liability merely to the amount of benefits that he has
paid by the date of judgment would further exaggerate the unfair-
ness of forcing the third party to pay to benefit the workers' com-
pensation system.
The second solution, having the employer contribute to the de-
fendant periodically as he would ordinarily pay the employee, was
also rejected by the Minnesota Supreme Court.258 The employer in
Wilken argued that it should only be required to pay contribution to
the third party as the future payments owed to the employee be-
come due.2 59 This method allows for a more exact representation of
the employer's workers' compensation liability for the purpose of de-
termining the employer's contribution liability. The procedure to be
followed under this solution would be equivalent to a declaratory
judgment handed down by the court which would provide for peri-
odic accountings of future benefits, and, therefore, future contribu-
tion payments to be paid by the employer.
The third solution is to reduce the amount of the future payments
the employer is statutorily required to pay to present value and then
have the employer pay the contribution claim in a single, lump sum
judgment. This approach was adopted by the Minnesota Supreme
Court in Wilken v. International Harvester Co.26 0 There, the court
reasoned that reducing future workers' compensation payments to
present value in a contribution claim is no more difficult than the
calculation of past, present, and future damages in a tort action.26'
256. 363 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 1985). The Wilken court held that "the employer contributes to
the third-party tortfeasor an amount equal to its proportionate share of the employee's tort recov-
ery but not to exceed the amount of workers' compensation benefits the employer has paid and
will in the future pay to the employee." Id. at 767 (emphasis added).
257. Id. at 766.
258. Id. at 767.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. The court stated: "The contribution award, like the tort verdict, necessarily involves ap-
proximations based on reasonable assumptions. True, the employee next year may die or recover,
but these uncertainties do not prevent the measurement of a lump sum verdict against the third-
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This approach best serves the interests of the third party and is sup-
ported by Minnesota precedent. However, the second solution most
strongly protects the interests of employers, which was the major
policy concern of the Illinois Supreme Court's Kotecki decision.
Another issue to be examined under the second scenario is
whether supplementary benefits, either paid immediately or poten-
tially payable in the future, are to be included as a measure of the
employer's workers' compensation liability. 2 The Wilken court an-
swered this question in the negative.263 The court held that supple-
mentary benefits in Minnesota are not a direct part of an individual
employer's workers' compensation liability to a particular employee
because payments of supplementary benefits by employers are reim-
bursed by a Special Compensation Fund which is funded by em-
ployers and their insurers." In Illinois, payment of supplementary
benefits is made directly from the Rate Adjustment Fund.265 The
connection between payment by employers and the receipt of sup-
plementary benefits by the employee is even more attenuated in Illi-
nois than it is in Minnesota .26  Therefore, it seems probable in Illi-
nois that the amount of supplementary benefits paid to employees
will not be included in the employer's workers' compensation
liability.
c. When the workers' compensation claim is still pending for trial
at the Illinois Industrial Commission
Under the third scenario, where the employee's workers' compen-
sation claim may be pending trial at the Illinois Industrial Commis-
sion at the time of judgment in the tort action, the perplexing issues
that arise are: 1) how the extent of the employer's liability in contri-
bution is determined and 2) who decides what constitutes the em-
ployer's statutory liability under the Workers' Compensation Act.
Like the second scenario, the employer would argue that the em-
ployer's liability is capped at the amount of workers' compensation
benefits that it has paid up to the time of the verdict in the em-
ployee's tort action. The third-party tortfeasor, however, would
party tortfeasor." Id. at 767-68.
262. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
263. 363 N.W.2d at 768.
264. Id. at 769.
265. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.8(g) (1991) (820 ILCS 305/8(g) (1992)).
266. See Bohrer, supra note 151, at 121.
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maintain that the employer's contribution liability must be deter-
mined in accordance with a reasonable estimation of what the em-
ployee could ultimately receive in workers' compensation benefits if
the claim was brought and taken to its fruition. As discussed above,
the most logical conclusion is that the limit on the employer's con-
tribution liability should equal the "value" of the workers' compen-
sation claim, not just the amount paid at the time of the trial of the
action.
The question that remains is who will measure that value. There
are only three parties who could potentially complete this task: the
jury, the trial judge, and an arbitrator at the Illinois Industrial
Commission. The jury cannot determine the employer's workers'
compensation liability because the collateral source rule forbids the
admission of any evidence of workers' compensation benefits in an
action by an injured employee against a third party.26 7 If the trial
judge were to make the determination as to the amount of the em-
ployer's workers' compensation liability, this decision would be
made after a post-trial hearing in a proceeding that would be
equivalent to, and have the same effect as, a declaratory judgment.
If, however, the trial judge thinks that the determination of the em-
ployer's workers' compensation liability is one that is more properly
made by an arbitrator at the Illinois Industrial Commission, the
judge may request the state agency to review the facts and issue an
opinion as to the amount of the employer's workers' compensation
liability. The problem with this approach is that there is no statute
that gives the circuit court the power to take such action. 68 It is
also possible that the trial judge may stay the entry of judgment in
the contribution action until the arbitrator at the Illinois Industrial
Commission renders a decision on the employer's workers' compen-
sation liability. 9
d. When the employee has not filed a workers' compensation claim
Under the fourth scenario, where the employee never filed a
workers' compensation claim, the major issue is whether the em-
267. Sweeney v. Max A.R. Matthews & Co., 264 N.E.2d 170, 173 (Il. 1970).
268. ILL. REV..STAT. ch. 110, para. 3-111 (1991) (735 ILCS 53-111 (1992)) provides that the
circuit court has the power to reverse and remand a state agency's decision, to proffer questions to
a state agency that require further hearing, and even to give such instructions as may be proper,
but only where a hearing has been held by the agency.
269. See Bohrer, supra note 151, at 121.
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ployer has any liability under the Workers' Compensation Act at
all. If the injured employee could still file a workers' compensation
claim after judgment in the tort action, the employer may still be
liable under the Workers' Compensation Act. The amount of that
liability would be determined by the same means as used in the
third scenario. However, if the employee's workers' compensation
claim was barred by the statute of limitations,1 0 then the extent of
the employer's contribution liability is unclear.
The Kotecki decision states that the employer is not liable in con-
tribution for any amount greater than its statutory liability under
the Workers' Compensation Act.2  It would seem to follow that if
the employer's liability under the Workers' Compensation Act was
extinguished, the employer's liability in contribution would similarly
be disposed of. This result, however, is contrary to the policy goals
of the Kotecki decision. The goal in Kotecki was to protect the im-
munity guaranteed to employers by passage of the Workers' Com-
pensation Act, while allowing third-party tortfeasors some measure
of contribution to support their interest in not being forced to pay
more than their established fault 272 Therefore, the probable result
in this scenario would be that, even if the employer's workers' com-
pensation liability was extinguished by operation of the statute of
limitations, the employer would be liable in contribution limited by
the "value" of the employee's workers' compensation claim had it
been pursued.
2. The Nature and Extent of the Manufacturer's Liability under
Kotecki
It is really the manufacturer who bears the burden of the Kotecki
decision. The extent of that burden depends, to some degree, on how
the Illinois Joint Liability Statute 73 is interpreted by the Illinois
courts. That statute provides that in a contribution action,
[a]ny defendant whose fault, as determined by the trier of fact, is less than
25% of the total fault attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by
the plaintiff, and any third party defendant who could have been sued by the
plaintiff, shall be severally liable for all other damages. 27'
270. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.6(d) (1991) (820 ILCS 305/6(d) (1992))..
271. Kotecki v. Cyclops Welding Corp., 585 N.E.2d 1023, 1028 (III. 1991).
272. Id. at 1027.
273. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1117 (1991) (735 ILCS 52-1117 (1992)).
274. Id.
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The question that arises is whether the fault of an employer in a
Kotecki situation is included in the calculation of total fault under
the Joint Liability Statute. If the employer's fault is included, the
manufacturer may be only severally liable where its fault is less
than twenty-five percent of the total fault attributable to the plain-
tiff, the employer, and itself. If the employer's fault is not included,
then the manufacturer is jointly liable unless its fault is less than
twenty-five percent of the fault attributable only to the plaintiff and
itself.
The resolution of this issue centers around whether the employer
is considered a "third party defendant who could have been sued by
the plaintiff.12 75 It is almost certain that the employer will be con-
sidered a party who could have been sued by the plaintiff since Illi-
nois courts have held that the employer immunity provided by the
Workers' Compensation Act is an affirmative defense, not a bar to
the employee's substantive cause of action.2 76 Thus, an employee
can sue her employer successfully if the employer does not raise the
immunity. Therefore, if the original defendant's fault is determined
to be less than twenty-five percent of the total combined fault, the
original defendant will probably only be liable for its pro rata share
of the damages in accordance with its degree of fault. Nonetheless,
if an original defendant is determined to be any more than twenty-
five percent negligent, it will have to bear almost the entire burden
of the judgment while the potentially more culpable employer will
only pay the comparatively small workers' compensation liability.
However, if the employer is not considered a party "who could
have been sued by the plaintiff,2 77 the original defendant will be
liable for almost the entire judgment regardless of its share of fault.
This result occurs only if the employer immunity is considered a
substantive, not merely a procedural, bar to any cause of action by
an employee against her employer. This is the conclusion suggested
by the language of the Workers' Compensation Act, which states
275. Id. (emphasis added).
276. Doyle v. Rhodes, 461 N.E.2d 38"2, 386 (111. 1984). The court held as follows:
The Workers' Compensation Act provides employers with a defense against any ac-
tion that may be asserted against them in tort, but that defense is an affirmative one
whose elements - the employment relationship and the nexus between the employ-
ment and the injury - must be established by the employer, and which is waived if
not asserted by him in the trial court.
Id.
277. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1117 (735 ILCS 52-1117 (1992)) (emphasis added).
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that "[n]o common law or statutory right to recover damages from
the employer, . . . other than the [workers'] compensation [bene-
fits] herein provided, is available to any employee . ".2.."I78 Never-
theless, this result is contrary to the conclusion reached by the Illi-
nois Supreme Court in Doyle v. Rhodes.17 9
The limitation of the employer's contribution liability comes at
the expense of the original defendant. However, original defendants
can take some comfort in the knowledge that in Illinois, they have a
limited contribution right, which is not the case in the majority of
jurisdictions. 80
C. The Kotecki Decision Represents a Rebalancing of Policy
Considerations
1. The Right of Contribution
Kotecki represents a blow to the policies that underlie the right of
contribution. In Skinner,281 the lower courts held that the plaintiff
could not sue his employer in a tort action because the Workers'
Compensation Act insulated employers from negligence actions
brought by injured employees. 82 Nevertheless, the Illinois Supreme
Court allowed a contribution action against the employer. In other
words, the court felt that the interests in equitable apportionment of
damages superseded the interests behind the no-fault system of
workers' compensation. The court placed no limitation on the
amount of contribution that the employer could be liable for be-
cause the doctrine of equitable apportionment demanded that liabil-
ity be equal to the third-party defendant's culpability. To place a
ceiling on the third-party defendant's liability would be contrary to
the very principles that supported the contribution action in the first
278. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.5(a) (1991) (820 ILCS 305/5(a) (1992)).
279. 461 N.E.2d 382, 386 (I11. 1984).
280. The majority (45) of other jurisdictions do not allow a defendant sued in tort by an in-
jured employee to maintain a contribution action against an employer. See Kotecki v. Cyclops
Welding Corp., 585 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (I11. 1991); see also supra note 125 and accompanying
text (listing cases from these jurisdictions).
281. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 374 N.E.2d 437 (II1. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
282. Id. at 438. The Workers' Compensation Act provides:
No common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer [or] his
insurer . . . for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line
of his duty as such employee, other than the compensation herein provided, is availa-
ble to any employee who is covered by the provisions of this Act.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.5(a) (820 ILCS 305/5(a) (1992)).
1992]
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
place.
The court in Kotecki strenuously argued that it was not aban-
doning precedent and that both Skinner and Doyle left open the
question of whether the employer's liability for contribution is lim-
ited to the employer's workers' compensation liability. 283 However,
much to the contrary, Kotecki completely abandoned the principle
behind the right of contribution that was created in Skinner and
affirmed in Doyle. The result in Kotecki cannot be disputed. There
was no equitable apportionment of damages based on relative fault,
and thus there was no true contribution. The court in Kotecki im-
plicitly rebalanced the policy considerations that support both em-
ployer immunity and the right to contribution, and it found the em-
ployer's interests to weigh more heavily than the third party's. In
Skinner, the court weighed the same two factors and found that
there is no equity if immunity prevents equitable apportionment. 284
The variables never changed. The court's conception of equity, how-
ever, did.
In the past, each time a court has been faced with a contribution
action against a defendant protected by either a statutory or com-
mon law immunity, it balanced the competing policy considerations
that support the right of contribution and that of immunity. 285
Courts consistently found that the policy of equitable apportionment
outweighed the policy that supports immunity.2 86 Illinois courts have
consistently relied on the Doyle court's reasoning that the Contribu-
tion Act focuses on the "culpability of the parties rather than on the
precise legal means by which the plaintiff is ultimately able to make
each defendant compensate him for his loss.' '287 This is no longer
the rule after Kotecki.
2. Strict Liability
There is an inherent conflict between the policies underlying con-
tribution and those behind strict liability. Strict liability in product
283. Kotecki, 585 N.E.2d at 1025.
284. Skinner, 374 N.E.2d at 443.
285. See Hartigan v. Beery, 470 N.E.2d 571, 572 (I11. App. Ct. 1984); Moon v. Thompson, 469
N.E.2d 365, 366 (II1. App. Ct. 1984).
286. "[W]hen balancing the right of contribution with a conflicting immunity, the [Illinois
courts] have generally found that the law of contribution must prevail." Hartigan, 470 N.E.2d at
572; see supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of the contribution statute
and its interplay with various types of immunity).
287. Doyle v. Rhodes, 461 N.E.2d 382, 388 (II1. 1984).
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liability actions developed primarily to protect injured consumers
and is designed to protect plaintiffs' rights. 88 Contribution is
designed to promote fairness to defendants and focuses on defend-
ants' rights.2 89 The concept of fault is a key factor in the proper
allocation of liability among tortfeasors in negligence actions, but
theoretically, it has no place in strict liability actions. 90
The rationale for allocating damages among parties with a com-
mon denominator such as negligence cannot be easily transferred to
a situation such as that in Skinner291 and Kotecki where contribu-
tion is sought among defendants who are potentially liable on the
completely different theories of negligence and strict liability. While
negligence is grounded in fault, strict liability considers fault to be
irrelevant. As Chief Justice Ward pointed out in his dissenting opin-
ion in Skinner, there is no common standard of comparison on
which to base contribution. 9"
Skinner allowed a defendant sued in strict liability to seek contri-
bution from another party. In doing so, it altered the effect intended
by strict liability. Skinner relieved the originally responsible party of
part of the burden of loss. Thus, under Skinner, strict liability loses
much of its leverage as a means of consumer protection since manu-
facturers of defective products no longer necessarily bear the full
burden of compensating victims for harm arising from defective
products they offer to the public. Justice Dooley, dissenting in Skin-
ner, persuasively criticized the decision on the basis that the doc-
trine of strict liability had been "implicitly overruled" and its intent
frustrated by allowing the manufacturer of a defective product to
288. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 98, at 692; see also supra notes 49-59 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the principles of product liability).
289. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 50, at 337; see also supra notes 27-30 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the principles of contribution).
290. KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 75, at 534.
291. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 374 N.E.2d 437 (111. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
292. Id. at 445 (Ward, J., dissenting).
The majority says that the extent of liability among tortfeasors should be determined
by their relative roles in proximately causing the plaintiff's injuries, but it seems to
me that this formula cannot properly be applied in the absence of a common standard
of comparison. The plaintiffs seek to recover on the ground of strict liability; the de-
fendants in their third-party complaints allege negligence by the employers. What will
be the method of comparison, with negligence not a factor in determining the defend-
ants' liability?
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seek contribution. 293
Kotecki placed the burden back on the manufacturer in a product
liability action because the defendant manufacturer can no longer
look to contribution from the employer to substantially mitigate its
liability. The manufacturer can still receive contribution from a neg-
ligent employer. However, considering how small workers' compen-
sation awards generally are in comparison to tort damages from the
same injury, the bulk of the burden is retained by the manufacturer
pursuant to the Kotecki decision. The public policy considerations
that were discussed in Suvada v. White Motor Co.,294 and that were
largely abandoned in Skinner, are given new life under Kotecki.
3. Workers' Compensation
The Kotecki decision represented a rebalancing of the workers'
compensation system and the right of contribution. The Illinois Su-
preme Court decided that the scales of justice should be tipped
heavily in favor of the former. The court had balanced the same
factors in Skinner and reached a very different result. In Skinner,
the court decided that the doctrine of equitable apportionment could
not be impinged by the employer immunity provided under the
Workers' Compensation Act.295 Under Kotecki, it appears as if no
principle is weightier than employer immunity. Apparently, the in-
tegrity of the workers' compensation system is important enough to
make a stranger to the system, a party that gained nothing from the
quid pro quo of workers' compensation, pay well over its fair share
of fault in order to protect the employer immunity. The pendulum
has clearly and decisively swung in a new direction.
III. IMPACT
A. Impact on Employers
Employers are the true beneficiaries of the Kotecki decision. The
employers' previously unlimited exposure in this context has been
eliminated. The employer is no longer faced with full exposure to
jury verdicts in cases where a third party is potentially liable to the
employee. The exclusive protection granted to employers by the Illi-
293. Id. at 447, 449 (Dooley, J., dissenting).
294. 210 N.E.2d 182 (111. 1965); see supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (discussing
Suvada).
295. See supra notes 76-92 and accompanying text (discussing Skinner).
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nois legislature in the Workers' Compensation Act has been, in
large measure, restored. The employer now has the ability to predict
its risk in the enterprise of creating and maintaining employment
opportunities. The rule espoused by the court in Kotecki eliminates
the previously illogical situation in which an employer was far better
protected if it was the sole cause of the employee's injury.296
The purpose of the Kotecki decision is to insulate employers and
protect the workers' compensation system. However, this decision
has a number of negative policy implications. The new decision may
discourage employers from following safe work practices. Safety
costs money, and employers will no longer have the significant de-
terrent of unlimited tort liability to its workers under Kotecki. With
this cap on employers' liability, there are fewer reasons for cost-
conscious employers to take protective safety measures.
Still, for those same reasons, the Kotecki decision should operate
to decrease insurance costs for businesses and, thus, help to entice
industry into the state of Illinois. One of the major complaints of the
Skinner decision was that it would drive industry out of the state.
For instance, in his dissenting opinion in Skinner, Justice Dooley
stated, "It is common knowledge that the high cost of workmen's
compensation insurance is driving industry out of this state. ' 297 It
appears that Justice Dooley's admonition has been heeded by the
Kotecki court fourteen years later.
B. Impact on the Original Defendant
The Illinois Supreme Court decided that the policy considerations
that support the no-fault workers' compensation system were so
strong that the Kotecki decision was the most just result for the
situation. The court stated that the "Minnesota rule provides the
fairest and most equitable balance between the competing interests
of the employer and the third-party defendant. 2 98 However, this
conclusion ignores the fact that it is the original defendant that will
296. If the employer was the sole cause of the injury, then its only potential liability would be
the statutory benefits required under the Workers' Compensation Act. There is no possibility of a
third-party action in this type of case; thus, there is no potential for a contribution action. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.5(a) (1991) (820 ILCS 305/5(a) (1992)).
297. Skinner, 374 N.E.2d at 453 (Dooley, J., dissenting).
298. Kotecki v. Cyclops Welding Corp., 585 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (111. 1991). The Minnesota
rule is the limitation on an employer's liability in contribution to the amount of statutory liability
under workers' compensation as decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Lambertson v. Cin-
cinnati Corp., 257 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 1977).
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pay the cost of supporting the policy interests of the workers' com-
pensation system. A basic flaw of this decision is that one party may
pay far more than its fair share of damages, while the other party
will potentially pay far less than its proportionate share. The deci-
sion insulates the potentially very negligent employer while sacrific-
ing the potentially marginally negligent defendant by limiting the
employer's liability to the amount of workers' compensation benefits
paid out to the plaintiff employee. The original defendant is forced
to pay the rest of the judgment without regard to its degree of
negligence.
C. Impact on the Plaintiff
Although the Kotecki decision comes mainly at the expense of the
original defendant, the plaintiff also stands to lose. Now, instead of
having two pockets to look to for satisfaction of the judgment, there
will only be that of the original defendant. If the original defendant
is insolvent, the plaintiff will have no way to collect reasonable com-
pensation. Under the old law, if the original defendant was insol-
vent, the plaintiff could still collect her damages from the employer
by assignment of the original defendant's contribution action. Under
Kotecki, since the contribution action is of little value, little can be
acquired by assigning a contribution claim to a plaintiff.
The interplay of Kotecki and the Illinois Joint Liability Statute299
also works to the detriment of the plaintiff. The extent of this effect
centers around these words of the statute: "defendant who could
have been sued by the plaintiff."300 The employer will probably be
considered such a party.30 1 This conclusion is reached by examina-
tion of the court's decisions that the plaintiff could, in fact, sue his
employer successfully unless the employer raises the affirmative de-
fense of the employer immunity.302 Thus, because the employer
would be considered a party "who could have been sued by the
plaintiff," the employer's fault is included in determining the per-
centage of the original defendant's fault.30 3 For example, if the orig-
inal defendant was determined to be responsible for ten percent of
299. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1117 (1991) (735 ILCS 52-1117 (1992)).
300. Id.
301. See supra notes 273-79 and accompanying text (discussing the nature and extent of manu-
facturer and employer liability).
302. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.5(a) (820 ILCS 305/5(a)).
303. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1117 (735 ILCS 52-1117).
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the fault, the employer was responsible for ninety percent of the
fault, and the verdict was entered for $100,000, the original defend-
ant would be responsible only for $10,000. a0 " This is because the
statute provides that where a party's fault is less than twenty-five
percent of the total fault, it is only severally liable.30 5 A defendant
who is severally liable, by definition, cannot be required to pay more
than its proportionate share.30 6 Thus, when the Illinois Joint Liabil-
ity statute operates to make the original defendant severally liable,
no contribution can be sought from the employer. Furthermore, the
employer has a right to recoup any benefits paid out under Workers'
Compensation for any money recovered by the plaintiff from the
original defendant.0 Therefore, in the above example, not only
would the employer not have to pay any part of the damages, but if
the employer had paid out $10,000 in workers' compensation bene-
fits, the plaintiff conceivably would have to reimburse the employer
the $10,000 (minus the costs) and be left with almost nothing.
Another impact of Kotecki that works to the detriment of the
plaintiff is that it will make it more difficult for plaintiffs to get
settlements. Kotecki substantially reduced employers' contribution
exposure. Therefore, employers will no longer waive their liens and
offer additional money in order to settle cases in which contribution
is sought from them. Plaintiffs will only be able to look to the de-
fendant manufacturer for compensation. With only one pocket to
look to for settlement, more cases will probably be tried, creating
more expenses for both the parties and the courts.
D. Impact on the Law of Contribution in Other Contexts
When the Illinois Supreme Court rendered its decision in
304. Because section 2-1117 provides that a defendant who is less than 25% negligent is only
severally liable for the plaintiffs injuries, cases at trial will hinge on the determination of whether
the manufacturer was more or less than 25% negligent. If the manufacturer is found to be less
than 25% negligent, the plaintiff will only be able to recover the percentage of her damages equal
to the percentage of the manufacturer's fault. If, hypothetically, the plaintiffs damages were ad-
judged to be $100,000, the manufacturer was found to be only 20% negligent, and the employer
was found to be 80% negligent, the plaintiff would only recover $20,000 in damages. Thus, the
primary goal of the plaintiff at trial will be to prove that the manufacturer was more than 25%
negligent. If the manufacturer is more than 25 % negligent, it will be jointly liable, thus enabling
the plaintiff to recover 100% of her damages from the manufacturer.
305. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1117 (735 ILCS 52-1117 (1992)).
306. See Walsh & Doherty, supra note 29, at 124.,
307. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.5(b) (820 ILCS 305/5(b) (1992)); see supra notes 43-
45 and accompanying text (outlining the employer's right to recoup benefits).
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Kotecki, it implicitly balanced the competing policy considerations
between the right of contribution and the conflicting employer im-
munity. In that case, the court found that the policy interests in
employer immunity outweighed those supporting the doctrine of eq-
uitable apportionment upon which the right to contribution is based.
The doctrine of equitable apportionment is the principle that all
tortfeasors should be responsible for damages in accordance with
their degree of fault. Clearly, in Kotecki, this did not occur. The
court found that it was more important to protect employers and the
workers' compensation system than to accomplish equitable appor-
tionment via the right of contribution. Prior to Kotecki, the Illinois
Supreme Court always favored the right of contribution over any
conflicting common law or statutory immunity.30 8
The Kotecki court thus gave less deference to the right of contri-
bution than it had in any case since the creation of the right to
contribution in Illinois. Since Kotecki is the Illinois Supreme
Court's latest interpretation of the right of contribution, it repre-
sents a new understanding of the weight to be given to contribution
when it conflicts with various other common law or statutory immu-
nities. Following Kotecki, a defendant may no longer be able to seek
contribution from a third-party defendant protected by such an
immunity.
CONCLUSION
Although the Illinois Supreme Court in Kotecki claimed that it
was not changing the right of contribution as it was created fourteen
years ago, it radically departed from its previous decisions interpret-
ing the law of contribution. Equitable apportionment took a back
seat to the protection of employers and their insulation from tort
liability. In essence, this was a reformulation of the competing poli-
cies that support both employer immunity and the right to contribu-
tion. Nevertheless, many may feel that this is the proper balancing
of policies and one that is most likely to help the economy by keep-
ing industry within the Illinois borders.
However, original defendants are now forced to pay the costs of
supporting the workers' compensation system and creating jobs in
Illinois. This is certainly not the equitable result that was envisioned
by the court in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machin-
308. See supra note 119.
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ery Co., where it decided that the principle of equitable apportion-
ment superseded all other competing considerations.
Michael S. Schachter

